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Abstract
RUN FOR YOUR LIFE: SPECTACLE PRIMARIES AND THE SUCCESS OF 'FAILED'
PRIMARY CANDIDATES 
By
Sean Patrick McKinley 
University of New Ham pshire, September, 2013
This thesis qualitatively examines the personal career outcomes of major presidential 
prim ary candidates from 1976-2008. It argues that the prim ary process fundam entally 
changed with the introduction of reform in the 1970s. It has continued to evolve into the 
"spectacle primary," a system whereby mere participation, not necessarily electoral 
success, can convey manifold benefits to subsequent careers in the public or private 
sectors. It also finds far less risk in prim ary participation than conventional wisdom 
might assume. Therefore, this thesis holds that prospective candidates w hen weighing a 
presidential prim ary bid, should consider these ulterior benefits beyond electoral 
success and all else being equal, they should decide to enter presidential prim ary 
contests.
Chapter I - Introduction
One m ight be forgiven for assum ing that in electoral politics, victory simply 
begets success while defeat begets failure. This logic makes sense in the hyper- 
competitive environment of the presidential nom ination process; to the victor goes the 
spoils of nom ination while the losers receive ostensibly nothing for their effort but 
ignominious defeat. Therefore, w hen a politician considers entering a presidential 
primary,1 the intuitive calculus is to w eigh their chance of w inning the nom ination 
against the estimable costs. If the possibility of securing the nom ination seems remote, 
conventional wisdom might dictate that the time, expense and  risks of a grueling 
campaign m ight make such a venture not w orthwhile. But this logic relies upon the 
assumption that winning the nom ination contest is the only possible benefit of the 
m odern nom ination process. It ignores the ability of viable prim ary participants to 
advance themselves despite being electorally unsuccessful in  their b id  for the 
presidential nomination. This thesis examines the personal outcom es of prim ary 
participants since 1976 and prevailing trends in prim ary politics. From this, it argues 
that the m odern prim ary system offers extensive and diverse potential personal 
opportunities to its viable participants while entailing extremely low  personal risk.
This is only possible because of the u tter transform ation of the presidential 
nominative process from the self-contained "autonom ous conventions"2 of the 19th
century to its present incarnation. Nom inating a presidential candidate is now  a 
spectacle; it is an incomparable venue and vehicle for its participants to advance 
themselves in their personal future endeavors in the public or private sector 
notw ithstanding their failure to secure the nom ination. This "spectacle prim ary" affords 
the opportunity for its participants to acquire experience, prestige, and visibility 
amongst the voting public, party elites, political operatives and potential employers.
These potential benefits can be seen in the historical record of the m any 
unsuccessful prim ary candidates since the inception of the spectacle prim ary system in 
the 1970s. W hat little attention is paid to these unsuccessful candidates is typically an 
electoral post-mortem attempting to diagnose the cam paign's cause of death. But the 
personal outcomes of these unsuccessful candidates indicate that there is less risk and 
more opportunity in a presidential prim ary than conventional w isdom  m ight assume. 
The losers of these contests have no t all been exiled into the political wilderness. On the 
contrary, m any have thrived in their careers in the public or private sectors.
The spectacle prim ary has been facilitated by a parallel exponential growth and 
diversification of the media, particularly in its coverage of politics. M edia coverage of 
"autonom ous convention"3 system and its "smoke-filled back-rooms" was largely in the 
form of traditional print media. Since then, radio, television and internet m edium s have 
provided an incessantly growing level of coverage of the process. Today, the public has 
extensive access to intense, real-time, visual coverage of even completely specious and
early political events that have little to no bearing on the actual nomination. Without 
this radical change in coverage, the change in the nom inative process alone likely 
w ould yield far fewer opportunities for public exposure of candidates. The fusion of 
structural and normative changes to the prim ary process w ith the m edia's expanded 
coverage has created an unparalleled platform  for politicians to benefit their personal 
futures.
This of course does not m ean that anyone can simply file papers to run  for 
President and instantly be transform ed into a political celebrity w ith their pick of 
lucrative career choices. Only those candidates who are publicly recognized as 
presidential candidates inherently will have the opportunities afforded to prim ary 
participants. One might think this w ould exclude only a few m arginal candidates, but 
in fact hundreds of people file official papers w ith the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) to run for President every election cycle. In the 2012 presidential cycle alone there 
were four hundred and thirty eight officially filed presidential candidates.4 We are not 
concerned w ith the vast majority of these people; the focus of this w ork is the effect of 
the presidential prim ary process on the outcomes of its "viable" participants.
To attain an accurate understanding of this effect, we should take a 
comprehensive look at the potential benefits and dow nsides of entering the prim ary 
process and the likelihood of these occurring. The m ost obvious benefit one could 
garner is being chosen as their party 's presidential nominee. This is clearly a very
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valuable possibility given the chance of being elected to the presidency. Yet most 
entrants in presidential primaries will not gam er their party 's nom ination. Especially 
for more marginal candidates w avering on entering, their hope of winning the 
nom ination is quite remote. Post-reform prim aries in both parties historically tend to be 
w on by candidates in the top tier of support and nam e recognition in very early 
prim ary polling.5 While there is typically considerable m ovem ent am ongst the other 
candidates before the conclusion of a prim ary cycle,6 the nom ination process as a whole 
is favorable towards frontrunners.7
For these more major candidates w ith a clear path  to their party 's nomination, 
potential benefits from a prim ary defeat are likely less im portant to their decision­
making process. Furthermore, these kind of well-known candidates stand to gain less 
than their more obscure counterparts precisely because they are already relatively 
familiar and supported; Hillary Clinton for example was likely already quite well- 
know n and respected before her presidential run  in 2008.8 The "benefits of losing" are 
still relevant to their calculus, but less crucial.
But for a somewhat marginal candidate equivocating on a presidential bid, the 
possibility of tangible personal and political benefits from mere participation in the 
prim ary process could plausibly decisively tip the scales in favor. Their chance of 
securing their party 's nomination m ay be small, bu t as long as they are able to establish 
themselves as viable contenders for the nom ination, they stand to benefit from the
4
spectacle of the prim ary process in w hatever venture they pursue after their defeat. And 
it appears that this trend is accelerating over time, as increasing am ounts of candidates 
w ith increasingly atypical previous experiences enter the prim ary process w ith little 
hope of victory and nonetheless find lucrative or prestigious subsequent opportunities.
A r e  E l e c t i o n s  O n l y  A b o u t  R e s u l t s ?
The majority of scholarly w ork and m edia coverage on American elections is
result-centric, attem pting to forecast or better understand electoral outcomes. 
Presidential electoral politics alone consists of a broad range of specific inquiries; 
am ongst innum erable examples, some try  to construct quantitative models to predict 
presidential general elections replete w ith  various criteria or variables such as economic 
conditions.9 Others attem pt to use more quantitative m ethods to discern presidential 
outcomes.10 Still others attem pt to better understand voter decision-making, ranging 
from how  voters form their opinions11 to the effect of the w eather of voter turnout.12
This research almost inevitably pursues a similar objective. In prim ary election 
contests, the majority of popular and academic electoral w ork is ultim ately concerned 
with the victorious candidate and w hy they won, or upon the unsuccessful candidates 
and w hy they did not win.13 This focus makes sense, bu t it neglects to examine a salient 
aspect of electoral politics, the effects of the electoral process itself beyond the direct 
outcome, specifically upon its participants.
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A small am ount of scholarly literature addresses this aspect of electoral politics, 
but typically the effects upon candidates themselves are referenced only tangentially in 
pursuit of another topic. Some examine candidates' decision to w ithdraw  from a 
prim ary cycle, including ulterior goals beyond securing the nom ination in their 
decision-making.14 There is also a brief m ention of the prototypical "advocacy 
candidate," one more interested in advancing an ideology or issue than w inning the 
prim ary contest.15 However, this author was unable to find any scholarly w ork that 
directly addresses w hat happens to prim ary candidates who lose, or challenge the 
assum ption that these candidates have harm ed their future personal prospects.
This thesis helps ameliorate this dearth of research by directly addressing 
evolving factors in the prim ary process and their effect on the subsequent outcomes of 
unsuccessful candidates. This kind of analysis requires a shift in the typical perception 
of politics and elections. It compels us to think about the options and choices of political 
figures not necessarily as the means to good public policy or even electoral victory, but 
to see them through the self-interested prism  of public choice theory.
Public choice is a branch of political theory that examines the m achinations of 
political systems through the prism of economics.16 It assumes that the m otivation for 
political figures and bureaucracies is not, as commonly believed, the prom otion of the 
public good, bu t is derived from a mix of political and economic self-interest.17 Public
6
choice theory places individuals' decision-making w ithin the political system and 
considers self-interest as a vital factor in that decision-making.
M e t h o d o l o g y
A  Q u a n t i t a t i v e  o r  Q u a l i t a t i v e  A p p r o a c h ?
A seemingly ideal way to understand the effect of presidential prim ary
participation on candidates w ould be to design a semi-experimental study that
examined the career of prim ary entrants using a p retest/posttest m odel w ith their failed
candidacy as the intervening variable. If we used a clear quantitative statistic such as
candidate income, we could dem onstrate the potential benefits of prim ary participation
in a straightforward and tangible way.
However, this strategy has a num ber of problems. Firstly, the financial records of
former candidates are not public inform ation unless they rem ain in governm ent after
their prim ary bid. Even these former candidates need only provide an estimate, limiting
the effectiveness of a quantitative study. For m any candidates, especially the less recent
ones, information on their post-bid income is going to be an estim ation at best and more
likely incomplete or absent altogether.
Even if we had this information, using strictly quantitative m ethods to elucidate
solely tangible benefits w ould not necessarily afford a com prehensive understanding of
individuals' career outcomes. Career success, especially am ongst political figures, is not
just about income; one of the possible desired goals could be a job w ith high am ounts of 
prestige but that is not necessarily highly paid.
Instead of using this more simplistic m ethod of quantitative measurement, this 
study examines the careers of the viable prim ary candidates from 1976-2008 and 
attempts to qualitatively dem onstrate prevailing beneficial trends of prim ary 
participation. To do this we need to select a population of unsuccessful prim ary 
candidates to investigate their personal outcomes. Determ ining this population is not as 
straightforward as one might assume because such a large am ount of people officially 
seek the presidential nominations in each election cycle. Of these, only a very select few 
are widely know n by the public or recognized by the media. These candidates stand to 
benefit from their prim ary participation precisely because the public is aware of their 
candidacy; those who are not widely know n inherently will not. If all official candidates 
were included in this study, the results w ould be corrupted by  the overwhelm ing 
num ber of candidates who, while they were official candidates, did not really 
participate in the prim ary process in any m eaningful way.
C a n d i d a t e  V i a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  S t a n d a r d  f o r  I n c l u s i o n
Therefore, we need to include only those "viable" presidential candidates whose
personal outcomes can be affected by their participation in the prim ary process. 
Differentiating between "viable" and "non-viable" candidates is no t a simple task
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Figure 1.1
Viable1 Presidential Primary Candidates Who Did Not 
Garner Their Party's Nomination: 1976-2000
Candidate Year Party Candidate i Year Party
i Bayh, Birch 1976 Democrat Harkin, Tom 1992 Democrat
; Bentsen, Lloyd 1976 Democrat Kerrey, Bob 1992 Democrat
I Byrd, Robert 1976 Democrat Tsongas, Paul 1992 Democrat
i Church, Frank 1976 Democrat Buchanan, Pat 1992,1996 Republican
I Harris, Fred 1976 Democrat Alexander, Lamar 1996 Republican
Humphrey, Hubert 1976 Democrat Gramm, Phil 1996 Republican
Jackson, Scoop 1976 Democrat Lugar, Richard 1996 Republican
McCormack, Ellen 1976 Democrat Forbes, Steve 1996, 2000 Republican
Reagan, Ronald 1976 Republican LaRouche, Lyndon 1980,1996, 2000 Democrat
Shriver, Sargant 1976 Democrat Keyes, A lan 1996, 2000, 2008 Republican
Udall, Mo 1976 Democrat Bauer, Gary 2000 Republican
Wallace, George l»7b Democrat Bradley, Bill 2000 Democrat
Brown, Jerry 1976, 1980,1992 Democrat McCain, John 2000 Republican
Anderson, John B. 1980 Republican Braun, Carol M oselsy 2004 Democrat
Baker, Howard 1980 Republican Clark, W esley 2004 Democrat
Bush George 11 W 1980 Republican Dean, Howard 2004 Democrat
Connally., John 1980 Republican Lieberman, Joe 2004 Democrat
Crane, Phil 1980 Republican Sharpton, A1 2004 Democrat
! Kennedy, Edward 1980 Democrat Edwards, John 2004, 2008 Democrat
Cranston, Alan 1984 Democrat Kucinich, Dennis 2004, 2008 Democrat
Glenn, John 1984 Democrat Biden, Joe 2008 Democrat
McGovern, George 1984 Democrat Clinton, Hillary 2008 Democrat
Hart, Gary 1984,1988 Democrat Dodd, Chris 2008 Democrat
Jackson, Jesse 1984,1988 Democrat Giuliani, Rudy 2008 Republican
Gephardt, Dick 1988, 2004 Democrat Gravel, Mike 2008 Democrat
Dole, Bob 1988 Republican Huckabee, Mike 2008 Republican
du Pont, Pete 1988 Republican Hunter, Duncan 2008 Republican
Gore, A1 1988 Democrat Paul, Ron 2008 Republican
Kemp, Jack 1988 Republican Richardson, Bill 2008 Democrat
Robertson, Pat 1988 Republican Romney, Mitt 2008 Republican
Simon, Paul 1988 Democrat Thom pson, Fred 2008 Republican
i - Garnered 1% or more of the national primary vote or 5% or more of the vote in a single primary
contest
Sources: Cook (2000), Presidential Elections: 1789-1992 (1995), "Dave Leip's A tlas of U.S. Presidential 
Elections."
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because the American electoral process has no concise, comprehensive standard or 
official threshold to definitively discrim inate betw een the two. Especially early in the 
prim ary process, candidate viability is a rather am orphous concept grounded more in 
perception than in tangible fact. In the so-called "viability primary," voters have 
extremely limited information on potential candidates and largely m ust rely upon 
"stature and reputation."18 Elites play a large role in  this process as their endorsem ents 
give cues to voters, the media, contributors, activists and aligned groups about which 
candidates are viable.19 Later in the process, prim ary voters mainly make their 
judgm ent of a candidate's viability and electability on their past perform ance in earlier 
prim ary contests.20
Despite this intangible quality, for m ost of the filed candidates for President the 
determ ination is quite obvious. The vast majority of official candidates have never held 
elected office, have never appeared in any form of m ainstream  m edia as candidates, and 
receive extremely few, if any, votes. But it is far more difficult for candidates on the 
margins whose viability is somewhat debatable.
Something as straightforward as polling num bers could am eliorate this problem, 
but prim ary polling was far less prolific in earlier election cycles. N or does there appear 
to be an overwhelming effort to preserve even relatively recent prim ary polling data. 
Because of this, we do not have consistent, comprehensive, reliable polling data to 
determine viability for the majority of the time period since 1976. Therefore I used an
intuitive standard, including any candidate w ho received at least one percent of the 
national prim ary vote or five percent w ithin a given state. This allows for candidates 
w ith broad but shallow appeal, those w ho get small vote shares bu t in m any places, as 
well as candidates with deep but narrow  appeal, those w ho get a more significant 
am ount of votes but only in one or a few prim ary contests. This also accommodates 
candidates w ho w ithdraw  from the race early and therefore receive very little of the 
national vote because their name was not on the ballot or their cam paign was 
suspended during later primaries. Using these candidates, we can construct a timeline 
of their major employment before and after their presidential bids and make summative 
observations about the data, trying to notice distinctive trends am ongst the candidates.
R e c e n t  C a n d i d a t e s  a n d  L i m i t a t i o n s
The lion's share of examples are from more recent presidential prim ary
candidates for two reasons: far more data is available for these candidates than 
participants in earlier primaries and because the spectacle prim ary system seems to be 
an increasing phenom enon w ith a more profound im pact on 2012 candidates than ones 
from 1976 w hen the spectacle prim ary was in its infancy.
The 2012 Republican prim ary cycle illustrated m any salient concepts and 
therefore m any candidates and elements from that cycle are included in this w ork as 
well. However, the losing candidates are not included in the p re /p o s t bid career
i i
analysis because the election was too recent to know  enough about w hat their 
subsequent careers will look like. Nevertheless, m any of them  were quite cogent 
examples that merited inclusion in the thesis.
Because we are dealing w ith the complexities of individuals' lives and careers, 
we cannot isolate a prim ary bid as an independent variable and  come to indubitable 
conclusions. There is also a relative paucity of data, and therefore a chance of 
random ness being mistaken for a trend. Since 1976, only sixty-two people have 
established themselves as "viable" presidential candidates and not w on their party 's 
nomination in  that election cycle. Furtherm ore, presidential prim aries only take place 
quadrennially, and it is rare for both parties to have a competitive prim ary in the same 
year. M any election cycles, such as the m ost recent 2012 election, feature only one party 
w ith a competitive primary. Given this relative infrequency, we cannot necessarily 
conclude trends are changing due to a single election cycle. With these limitations, this 
study is not necessarily indisputable, bu t it is a compelling circumstantial case that uses 
reasonable methodology and the best readily available data to elucidate the effect of the 
prim ary process on its participants.
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Chapter II - Changing Structures
T h e  E v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  P r i m a r y
T h e  A u t o n o m o u s  C o n v e n t i o n  S y s t e m
Politicians did not always have the opportunity to benefit from presidential
prim ary defeat. It has only emerged because of the evolution and gradual 
transform ation of the nomination system for presidential candidates and the coverage 
of these races by the media. The current nom ination system bears little resemblance to 
the cloistered and brief process that prevailed before the reforms of the Progressive era 
and the 1970s. Presidential candidates were nominally selected by a group of party 
adherents at the party convention, b u t in reality w ere chosen by a quite small group of 
party elites who largely directed the voting of the party  delegates.21 It was undoubtedly 
still quite a spectacle and in some w ays w as less predictable than the present-day 
prim ary system.
But crucially, the spectacle was one confined tem porally and  physically to the 
party convention. Rather than unfolding over m onths or years, crucial decisions were 
often m ade in a m atter of days and sometimes even hours. The real decision-making 
was made not by individual delegates on the convention floor bu t in proverbial and
*3
often literal smoke-filled back-rooms. Delegates themselves, m uch less the w ider voting 
public, often were not privy to internal negotiations and the proposed or discussed 
alternative candidates. This lack of awareness of the process m eant that those ultimately 
not selected as presidential candidates gained very little visibility if any at all. Thus a 
quixotic prim ary bid intent on acquiring ancillary benefits w ould be foolish. In fact, 
norms at the time prohibited any cam paigning at all for a presidential nom ination prior 
to the convention.22
T h e  P r o g r e s s i v e  R e f o r m s  a n d  t h e  B r e a k d o w n  o f  t h e  
S y s t e m
Reformists such as Robert LaFollette bem oaned the democratic deficit of this 
system and called for each citizen to have the choice of a direct vote w ithout party 
interference.23 Progressive era reforms seemingly brought this about w ith the 
introduction of primaries and caucuses w ith the purpose of em pow ering individuals 
and party adherents. Yet this did not substantially change the elite-dom ination of the 
selection of a presidential nominee.24 Entering a prim ary and securing broad popular 
support was not a prerequisite for the nom ination. While some prim aries apportioned 
delegates to victorious candidates, m any simply afforded an opportunity  for party elites 
to receive input from the party faithful and to allow prospective candidates to 
demonstrate their electability.25
This byzantine system w ith such indirect voter participation inevitably created 
tension between the party elites and the rank-and-file; it finally became completely 
untenable w ith the “outrageous" 1968 Democratic nom ination of H ubert H um phrey for 
President.26 The Democratic Party was in turmoil, torn between the image of the party 
dom inated by m oderates and traditional Democratic factions and the em erging more 
liberal and fiercely anti-war vision of the party. Two candidates w ho epitom ized this 
latter wing entered the prim ary contests as anti-w ar alternatives to sitting Democratic 
President Lyndon Johnson.27 Minnesota Senator Eugene M cCarthy took this audacious 
step first, lambasting Johnson's support for the Vietnam War and perform ing quite well 
in the New  Hampshire primary.28 At this sign of Johnson's vulnerability, Robert 
Kennedy, w ho had  been equivocating on a prim ary bid, jum ped into the fray as a 
second anti-war alternative.29 Besieged by opposition to the Vietnam War and now  
faced w ith an insurgency by two challengers w ithin his ow n party, Johnson w ithdrew  
his bid for renomination. However, both M cCarthy and K ennedy were not overly 
palatable to the old-guard Democratic party  bosses, w ho im plored Vice-President 
Hubert Humphrey, who had lost the nom ination to John E K ennedy in 1960, to run  and 
govern more in the mold of Johnson.30 Despite entering no prim aries, H um phrey 
garnered enough elite support w ithin the party  to receive the nom ination at the 
convention over the reeling anti-war faction's choice of M cCarthy following the 
assassination of Robert Kennedy.31 The selection of H um phrey dem onstrated that
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despite the introduction of primaries that ostensibly had  em pow ered the party  rank- 
and-file, elites had  largely retained the pow er to choose presidential nominees.
T h e  M c G o v e r n - F r a s e r  R e f o r m s  a n d  t h e  G e n e s i s  o f  t h e  
S p e c t a c l e  P r i m a r y
M any w ithin the Democratic Party saw the nom ination of H um phrey as so 
patently illegitimate that it soon became the casus belli for m eaningful reform of the 
nomination system. Bowing to pressure and hoping to unite the fractured party, 
H um phrey agreed to the formation of a committee for this purpose.32 While the 
attempts at reform during the Progressive era through the introduction of prim aries had 
had a largely cosmetic effect, these McGovern-Fraser reforms w ould be meaningful, 
resulting in a gradual bu t substantive shift in nom inative pow er away from elites and 
towards the party 's rank-and-file.33
The McGovern-Fraser reforms were not, however, a legally binding set of 
changes to electoral law. The committee itself w as merely an internal creation of the 
Democratic Party tasked with im proving their nom ination process.34 But the new  
prim ary system it helped create solidified and spread to the Republican Party through 
indirect means.35 Some state legislatures controlled by Democrats adopted new 
primaries and reasoned that the new process m ight be used for the Republican party  as 
well.36
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Beyond this institutional change, the new  system im m ediately produced more 
competitive Democratic primaries in 1972 and 1976.37 These contests provided a view of 
the new electoral landscape for later prospective Democratic and Republican candidates 
and attracted significant media attention in a relatively m odem  w ay for the first time.38 
Between these institutional and norm ative changes, the Republican Party soon adopted 
very similar election procedures as their Democratic counterparts. Before long, no 
candidate could expect to w in their party 's  nom ination w ithout entering m ost or all 
prim ary contests, the num ber of w hich began steadily increasing after the adoption of 
reform.39
T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  N e w  S y s t e m
A c a d e m i c  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  P r i m a r y  P r o c e s s
Scholars have identified some overarching rules or at least tendencies that have
emerged in the contemporary prim ary system. While m om entum  is not the sole 
determining factor,40 strong electoral outcomes in the earliest prim ary contests have a 
clear and significant effect on a candidate's fortunes,41 particularly in Democratic Party 
races.42 In those earliest prim ary contests, electability was a significant voter 
consideration in addition to general evaluations of the candidates seeking the 
nomination.43 Rank-and-file party members are m uch more im portant than in the pre­
reform system, but elites and semi-elites still play a significant role.44
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T h e  B i f u r c a t e d  B e n e f i t s  o f  P r i m a r y  P a r t i c i p a t i o n
The benefits of prim ary participation can be broken dow n roughly into two
categories; practical benefits and perception benefits. Practical benefits are tangible 
advantages a former viable candidate can enjoy, such as already having a relationship 
with cam paign professionals if a candidate decides to run  for President again. 
Perception benefits are less concrete, bu t equally im portant. They include the effect of 
participation in a prim ary on public notions of the candidate's visibility, likability and 
gra vitas.
For those seeking em ploym ent in the private sector, the less concrete cachet of 
being a former presidential candidate is a more im portant factor. This prestigious 
epithet combined w ith their m om ent in the sun  during the prim ary provides a sufficient 
boost to these candidates' public profiles for them  to garner num erous private sector 
jobs that they might otherwise not have secured. Yet their experience of the cam paign 
did very little if anything to prepare them  or make them  better at these private sector 
jobs. If a former candidate becomes a pund it or a paid speaker, the principal difference 
provided by their prim ary experience is that people are more likely to be interested in 
listening to them pontificating than they otherwise m ight be.
Alternatively, should a candidate w ish to continue their career in the public 
sector, practical benefits play a larger role. This is not to say that perception benefits are
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completely unim portant. A former prim ary entrant seeking appointm ent to a 
governmental post may profit from the prestige of being a form er prim ary participant. 
But the vast majority of candidates w ho remain in the public sector stay in elected 
office, and they can use the practical benefits of their prim ary experience to aid in their 
reelection to these positions or perhaps higher elected offices.
T h e  E l o n g a t e d  C a l e n d a r
The crucial distinction between the old and new  prim ary systems for the self-
interested candidate is the developm ent of an increasingly lengthy process w ith
meaningful prim aries and large-scale candidate participation. As the am ount of
competitive primaries increased and the first contest of each election cycle took place
earlier in the year, the process offered increasing opportunities to captivate public
attention. N or is the prim ary season confined to the beginning of the official prim ary
voting that itself now occurs nearly a year before the general election. The "invisible
primary," a period of intense competition for endorsem ents, operatives and funding,
now begins almost immediately after the end of the previous election. Events such as
the Ames Straw Poll, whose outcome actually led to a candidate's w ithdraw al in 2012,
begin more than a year before the general election, stretching the effective prim ary
calendar even further.
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Prim ary debates, which offer an im portant opportunity  for politicians to 
introduce and legitimize themselves as presidential candidates, have increased 
manyfold as well. In 1976, the first year of the post-reform period, Ronald Reagan 
challenged President Ford for the Republican nom ination and seven viable candidates 
vied for the open Democratic nomination. Yet there were only three debates, all of the 
Democratic side, w ith the first taking place in February.45 The tw o-party total increased 
to six in 1980, eleven in 1984, and tw enty-one in 1988 46 During the m ost recent electoral 
cycle in 2012 w ith only a Republican primary, tw enty debates w ere held, the first of 
which took place in mid-2011, almost a year and half before the general presidential 
election.4748
T h e  C a m p a i g n  E x h a u s t i o n  o f  F r e d  T h o m p s o n
While the current nom ination system offers a bevy of potential personal and
political opportunities, w hat should not be forgotten or understated is how  relentless
and grueling a process it has become. Earlier in electoral history, candidates faced a less
laborious workload; William McKinley w as able to largely w age his general election
campaign, from his home in Ohio and a prospective presidential candidate m ight
experience only a single day of competition for the nomination. Since then, the process
clearly has profoundly changed. The new  spectacle prim ary system has utterly
changed m odem  campaigning and could just as easily be term ed "the exhausting
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prim ary system." The very reasons the prim ary is now  an opportunity  for self- 
aggrandizem ent also inevitably entail more physical and mental effort on behalf of the 
candidates. It is now  entirely feasible for candidates to begin unofficially running for 
President directly after the previous m id-term  election, or even not long after the 
previous presidential contest, almost four full years before the general election. For 
those w ho run  in successive prim ary cycles, such as M itt Romney in 2008 and 2012, a 
candidate could expect to be essentially running for President for alm ost eight years.
The duration of the campaign inevitably becomes physically and psychologically 
wearing on candidates. A m odern example of a candidate being perhaps surprised by 
the strains or having changed their m ind in their com m itm ent to the cam paign is the 
somewhat farcical candidacy of Fred Thom pson in 2008. Thom pson entered the race 
with m uch fanfare at a time m arked by a perceived dearth of appealing Republican 
candidates.49 But Thompson almost imm ediately appeared to lack the necessary work 
ethic or im petus to conduct a successful m odem  campaign. Reports surfaced that his 
wife was the more prolific campaigner of the two. One observer opined, "I don 't think 
he really wants the job. He seems to be treating it as a part-tim e effort, a nice w ay to 
pass the time of day."50 His campaign m anager in New H am pshire was so disaffected 
by Thom pson's lethargy that he defected to John M cCain's campaign, saying, "Fred 
Thompson w ould have been a good candidate, bu t he doesn 't w ant to go out and 
campaign."51
This is an im portant cost for a prospective prim ary entrant to consider before 
their entry. But extensive campaigning and m ental effort is essentially the job of a 
politician w ith national aspirations, and one w ould expect them  to tolerate these rigors. 
Perhaps for a candidate such as Thom pson w ith more simple aspirations for his 
retirement, the process was too burdensom e to be worthw hile. But for m ost prospective 
prim ary entrants, even those w ith a quite distant chance of securing their party 's 
nomination, entrance into a prim ary w ould seem w orth the effort to partake in the 
moment for self-aggrandizement and the unlocking of future opportunities.
T h e  I n f l a t i o n , I n d e b t e d n e s s  a n d  A v o i d a n c e  o f
P r i m a r y  S p e n d i n g
Another consequence of the prim ary process's incessant grow th in length and
intensity is the exponential growth in political spending. Recent nom inees have almost
always raised more money than any other candidate in  the year before an election.52
Beyond the effort required to raise this money, the high financial dem ands of a m odern
campaign can impact a candidate's personal financial position. In the 2012 Republican
primary, Mitt Romney spent $76 million, or $18.50 per prim ary vote.53 For someone of
Romney's wealth and fundraising prowess, there w as little chance of him  becoming
personally indebted as a result of this spending for the long-term. But for m any other
candidates w ho need to at least approach such spending levels, avoiding significant
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personal debt is a pressing concern. While this seems like it w ould  be fleeting problem, 
the am ount of money and the duration of the debt can in some cases be substantial. 
Despite the massive amounts of m oney that candidates seem to be able to raise, it is a 
quite different m atter to raise money to retire the debt of an already failed candidacy.
Hillary Clinton's long and ultim ately unsuccessful cam paign for the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 2008 left her m ired in  debt that reportedly at one point 
totaled $25 million. With aid from the Obama cam paign following her concession and 
the fundraising help of her husband after the general election, Clinton was able to pay 
off her debt but only did so after the 2012 election, more than four years after she 
conceded the 2008 Democratic nom ination to Barack Obama.54 As of February, 2013, 
Newt Gingrich continues to work to pay dow n the $4.7 million lingering debt from his 
presidential campaign.55
While it w ould seem to be more of a problem  in recent elections w hen the 
am ount of money involved in political cam paigning has increased, presidential 
candidates from earlier electoral cycles were not im m une from these issues either. John 
Glenn sought the Democratic presidential nom ination in 1984 and amassed a debt of $3 
million.56 However, there is no legal deadline w hen cam paign debt m ust be repaid. 
While the lingering debt is likely quite irritating, a candidate John Glenn can take their 
time repaying their debt w ithout it likely significantly im pacting their personal 
standard of living. Glenn needed tw enty-three years to retire his debt via small
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individual donations but finally did alleviate himself of his cam paign debt in 2007.57 
Nor is it inevitable to run one's cam paign into significant debt. Ron Paul m anaged to 
m aintain a cam paign surplus in 2012 and is now able to use that m oney for other 
causes.
Furthermore, the advent and proliferation of Super PACs has lessened the need 
for personal fundraising to m aintain a prim ary campaign. While ostensibly 
independent, in 2012 each of the major Republican prim ary contenders had 
"unofficially official" Super PACs supporting their candidacies. As N ew t Gingrich bore 
the brunt of the better-financed M itt Romney, Sheldon Adelson, a billionaire casino 
owner, came to his rescue with a check for $5 million to Gingrich's Super PAC.58 
Adelson later floated the idea of contributing $10 or $100 million dollars to Gingrich or 
some other candidate.59 With his "unofficially official" Super PAC, underw ritten  by a 
small num ber of wealthy individuals, shouldering a significant am ount of the spending 
responsibility, Gingrich's campaign itself only needed to spend $21 million.60 In this 
new political finance environment, the im portance of direct spending by a candidate's 
campaign is substantially mitigated. A candidate wary of being left in debt need not 
seriously endanger their candidacy if they decide to cut back on direct spending 
because Super PACs, with access to unlim ited donations, can carry a large portion of the 
spending burden.
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And candidates whose m ain goal is self-promotion do not necessarily need to 
spend on a comparable level to the frontrunners to remain viable candidates and 
thereby achieve their aims. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama spent unprecedented 
amounts of money in their fierce prim ary contest in 2008 to be sure; a less plausible 
candidate like Chris Dodd did not spend anywhere near as much. Yet D odd and others 
did not need to do so to remain in the conversation, be invited to debates, and generally 
be perceived as a legitimate presidential candidates. Especially w ith the aid of a 
"unofficially official" sponsoring Super PAC, a candidate does no t really need to even 
spend significant amounts of time raising m oney for their ow n campaign; they can 
simply rely on the unlimited donations to Super PACs to rem ain in  the race. In this way, 
a self-interested candidate needs not even risk personal debt in the process.
W h y  D o  T h e y  S t a y ?
In almost every primary, it seems inevitable that at least one candidate lingers in
the contest, sometimes even to the point w hen the prim ary is effectively over, and 
another candidate begins to be labelled the "presum ptive nominee." The endurance of 
their campaigns suggests that there m ight be value in the perpetuation of campaigns 
beyond the goal of actually securing the nom ination.61 However, once the prim ary 
enters this later stage w ith the overall outcome no longer really in doubt, the contest
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receives far less public attention and therefore its participants have less opportunity to 
promote themselves or their ideas.
It appears from scholarly and historical evidence that greater opportunities are 
available to low-profile and issue advocacy candidates by perpetuating their losing 
candidacies than more well-known candidates.6263 This makes a good deal of intuitive 
sense; a candidate w ith high public visibility has little to gain from continued media 
coverage. Especially if this candidate is interested in continuing their political career, 
their portrayal as a prim ary loser w ho cannot accept their fate could leave their 
reputation substantially damaged.
But some candidates, those w ith few future political ambitions, have little to lose 
from remaining in the prim ary competition. Ron Paul's 2012 candidacy is quite 
instructive on this point. Having run  for President in 2008 and done surprisingly well 
on a libertarian platform, Paul again sought the Republican nom ination in 2012 but w ith 
little feasible chance of success. He had  also announced his intention not to 
simultaneously seek reelection to the House of Representatives and intended to retire 
from politics if d id  not secure the Republican nom ination for President.
Paul thereby met both conditions for a candidate w ith a vested interest to remain 
in the race. He had no planned political future and  therefore could endure the potential 
political costs of lingering in the race. He also had  a clear and distinct ideology that he 
had voraciously promoted. Paul himself adm itted to his supporters after Romney had
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mathematically clinched the nom ination that he w ould not officially w ithdraw  so that 
he and they could continue prom oting his brand of libertarianism  through the 
Republican convention.64
T h e  T r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  P o l i t i c a l  
M e d i a
T h e  L e v i a t h a n  M e d i a
This increasingly heavily loaded and lengthened electoral process w ould be
inconsequential w ithout the exponential increase in the scale and  variety of media
coverage. Today, the media has become a leviathan, growing to a scale that has changed
the way that people consume political information. The intense coverage and
conveyance of importance on the process by the m edia is the veritable sine qua non of
the spectacle primary.65 To put it more evocatively, the m edia acts as "a St. Peter
guarding the gates of the presidential nom ination process judging which candidates are
worthy of precious news space."66 Through this coverage, a viable candidate becomes
better know n by the public and can be elevated to a more prestigious position as a
former contender for their party 's nomination.
M odern political media coverage bears little resemblance to the pre-reform
period before the 1970s. The autonom ous convention system gave little if any
opportunity for failed candidates for the nom ination to gain any public exposure via the
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political media. Political norms prohibited open pre-convention lobbying for the 
nom ination and the convention itself took place relatively quickly behind closed doors 
w ith no mechanism to test the political strength of prospective candidates am ongst the 
public.67 After the Progressive-era reforms and the introduction of mainly non-binding 
primaries, the media paid somewhat m ore attention to some contests w hen a major 
candidate had deigned to enter or w hen a relative unknow n w as attem pting to prove 
his political strength, such as Kennedy's crucial performance in Wisconsin in the 1960 
prim ary cycle.68 But the am ount of coverage w as m ild relative to the present-day 
precisely because most prim ary contests only indicated a candidate's strength and did 
not directly translate into tangible results as m ost prim ary contests now  do.
The media was also far less diverse in form and far less technologically capable 
of political coverage than the m odern political media. Previous electoral coverage was 
confined to print, radio and relatively short new s program s on netw ork television. 
Technological advances have facilitated new  m ethods of national and even international 
campaigning.69 As the first post-reform prim aries in both parties raged in 1976, cable 
news and the internet did not yet exist. Their developm ent throughout the 1980s and 
90s has fundamentally transformed how  w e look at politics and in particular the 
prim ary process.
Part of the reason for the massive am ounts of political coverage on television is 
that larger cable news outlets like Fox News, CN N and MSNBC have massive amounts
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of time in their schedules to fill w ith some kind of news coverage. Lengthy presidential 
prim ary contests fill this void quite well. Long before any actual prim ary contests or 
even the first prim ary debate, the m edia can engage in the presidential prim ary process 
simply through speculation about the potential candidates. While these kind of "will 
they or w on 't they" stories are typically rather light on actual reporting, they provide a 
valuable mechanism for the media to attract interest in even a very distant prim ary 
contest.
T h e  P o l i t i c a l  M e d i a  a s  A r b i t r a t o r s  o f  C a n d i d a t e  
V i a b i l i t y
Once the field of presidential candidates has begun to form, the m edia has 
substantial pow er in determining w ho is w orthy of inclusion in the group of "viable" 
candidates. The viability of some prim ary contenders is never really in doubt. For 
instance,'as sitting Vice-President, A1 Gore was inevitably going to be perceived as a 
major viable candidate for the 2000 Democratic nomination. But for more marginal 
entrants, the designation is not so obvious. Perception is the crucial elem ent because 
there are no concrete criteria to anoint a candidate as viable.
Viability and momentum are crucial components to a successful campaign, yet 
they are quite vague and intangible. Collective notions of a candidate's "expectations" 
are extremely difficult to determine. Thus the same electoral outcome can alternatively 
be seen as a setback or prom pt Bill Clinton to pronounce himself the "Comeback Kid."70
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Therefore, the distinction between viable and non-viable candidates often becomes a 
self-fulfilling judgment; a candidate w ho is perceived as viable likely will in fact be 
viable. In fact, some scholars argue that the m ain determ inant of the all-important 
m om entum  a candidate needs to survive and flourish in prim ary campaigns is simply 
subjective media coverage of the candidate.71
The media exert substantial influence on this perception through a variety of 
direct and indirect means. While once m edia effects were seen as a m yth or of minimal 
import, some emerging scholarly evidence points to the contrary.72 D uring the "invisible 
prim ary" the media plays a pivotal role in  determ ining the field of viable candidates. 
This tends to lend itself to helping frontrunners, since the m edia has an interest in 
featuring viable and potentially successful candidates and because frontrunners have 
more access to the national press and the broader national electorate.73 At this point in 
the process, candidates have little m oney on hand  to build  m uch-needed name 
recognition, making free and potentially positive news coverage highly im portant.74 
Even hum orous political media shows such as The Colbert Report have the potential to 
act as media cues to voters, as an appearance on the show and thereby receiving the 
much-celebrated "Colbert Bump" appears to actually positively im pact a candidate's 
donation figures.75
The media appears to support certain candidates to w hom  they are more 
personally amenable as well as give m ore attention to candidates w ho have electoral
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m om entum .76 They also of course have a heavily vested interest in maximizing their 
viewership by the public. Therefore they have a pow erful incentive to devote their time 
to those candidates that are seen as viable or interesting by the public. This selective 
power is substantial, as they act sim ultaneously as a reflection and determ inant of a 
candidate's viability in the public mind. But ultimately, the decision to include a 
candidate in im portant prim ary m om ents like debates or to attach a reporter to a 
campaign, or to include their name as a possible candidate in a poll are largely arbitrary, 
driven not just by public opinion bu t by m edia elites' personal opinions and  biases.
This pow er is exercised in a variety of direct and indirect means. M edia outlets 
commission an astounding and consistently growing num ber of polls. The first survey 
of likely Republican prim ary voters for the 2012 nomination, conducted by Rasmussen 
Reports, took place a single day after the 2008 general election.77 This w as followed by a 
further one hundred and ninety-five prim ary polls for the Republican nom ination until 
the effective conclusion of the race in April 2012.78 W hether a m arginal candidate is 
included am ongst the list of names to be asked of respondents can have a profound 
initial effect upon their name recognition and the perception that they are legitimately 
in the race for the presidential nomination.
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I n c l u s i o n  a n d  E x c l u s i o n  i n  P r i m a r y  D e b a t e s
But perhaps the most direct m eans for the media to wield inclusion or
exclusionary power is through the venue of prim ary debates. It is generally agreed 
upon in academic circles that general election debates have m inimal im pact upon  voter 
choice and "tend to reinforce preexisting attitudes and preferences."79 Prim ary debates, 
however, lacking the partisan and ideological differences that largely neuter the effect of 
general election debates, have been found to have a more profound effect on voter 
perceptions of the participants.80 By conducting increasingly num erous prim ary 
debates, the media have the potential to alter voters' perceptions about a candidate's 
viability and m om entum .81 Inclusion in these events can be a boon to the viability of a 
marginal candidate, while exclusion can be devastating.
For instance, Gary Johnson, a popular form er governor of N ew  Mexico, waged 
an adm ittedly improbable bid for the 2012 Republican nom ination. His extremely 
libertarian brand of republicanism w as undeniably at odds w ith  the majority of the 
Republican Party. Yet fellow libertarian Ron Paul had  been considered a viable 
candidate as a relatively unknow n com m odity in the 2008 Republican primary. 
Furthermore, Johnson's popularity in his hom e state of New Mexico game him  some 
reason for cautious optimism of at least being seen as a viable participant by virtue of 
being a "favorite son." He was included in the first of the Republican debates and quite 
candidly expressed some of his more radical political beliefs such as legalization of 
narcotics and complete lack of governm ent restrictions on abortions, two positions that
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are anathem a to a typical Republican prim ary voter. One could plausibly argue that this 
ideological variance w ith his electorate w ould make Johnson's candidacy unw orthy of 
inclusion am ongst the major candidates. Yet Ron Paul's success in  2008 and 2012 w ith 
similar beliefs w ould seem to dispel this explanation. One m ust also rem em ber this was 
many m onths before a single prim ary vote was cast, w hen a larger debate field w ould 
be more feasible and perhaps advisable. Nevertheless, Johnson w as not invited to any 
subsequent debate and coverage of his campaign, already som ew hat lackadaisical, fell 
dramatically.82 CNN, the sponsors of the first debate to exclude Johnson, reasoned that 
his low polling numbers disqualified him  from inclusion in the field of debate 
candidates.83 Yet they neglected to m ention that they themselves had  not even included 
Johnson's nam e in m uch of their ow n polling in the m onths leading up  the debate.84 
Johnson's case demonstrates that the m edia's decision on the inclusion or exclusion of 
candidate becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy and is often based on pre-conceived 
visceral notions of the candidate. If a candidate cannot substantiate themselves enough 
to w arrant attention, they will not likely receive any and will lose an invaluable 
opportunity to present themselves to the voting public.
A more explicit example of the m edia m aking a unilateral decision on a 
candidate's viability occurred during the 2004 Democratic prim aries. In a debate hosted 
by ABC, host Ted Koppel rather pointedly asked three candidates on the fringe of 
viability, Dennis Kucinich, Carol Moseley Braun and A1 Sharpton, w hether their
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nom ination bids were mere "vanity cam paigns."85 Kucinich in particular expressed his 
dismay at the question and strongly pushed back against assertions of his irrelevancy.86 
The following day, ABC withdrew its coverage of the trio 's cam paigns.87
P e r s o n a l  S c r u t i n y  a n d  t h e  " S p o u s a l  V e t o " o f  t h e  
M i t c h  D a n i e l s  C a n d i d a c y
The extremely intensive m edia coverage in the m odem  prim ary system is an
essential ingredient in the potential benefits from participation in the prim ary process.
But this exhaustive coverage also entails unparalleled scrutiny of candidates' personal
life. This scrutiny can take a profound toll upon the candidate them selves or upon  their
family. Despite the positive potential effects of the prim ary process, prospective
candidates are still people with very personal considerations, sometimes considerations
that are ultimately more im portant than being a presidential nom inee or deriving the
benefits of merely participating in the process.
A m odern example of a plausible candidate who spurned the prim ary process is
Mitch Daniels, the former Director of the Office of M anagem ent and Budget and
Governor of Indiana, whom some encouraged to seek the Republican nom ination in
2012. Daniels eventually declined, and speculation ran  ram pant that Daniels' wife,
Cheri, had exercised her "spousal veto" on the idea, fearing intense m edia speculation
regarding their previous estrangem ent and subsequent reconciliation.88
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It is unclear whether this was the decisive factor in Daniels' decision or w hether 
he ever intended to run for President at all. But it is instructive in  that we should take 
care not to be too clinical in assessing the impact of a presidential bid upon an 
individual. In order to obtain the benefit of prim ary participation, a candidate m ust be 
willing to sacrifice extensive am ounts of their time and their privacy and expose their 
loved ones to scrutiny and attention; for some, this is simply too high a price to pay. 
While it is sentimental and personal and difficult to quantify, this is a potential 
downside that should not be casually dism issed w hen considering a presidential bid.
T h e  M e d i a  a s  B e n e f i c i a r i e s  o f  t h e  S p e c t a c l e
The m odern prim ary process relies upon the m edia to convey importance and
attention upon it. But the length and intensity of the spectacle prim ary system also can
be beneficial to the political media. The entire process now  stretches its contests over the
course of almost six months. In 2012, the first contest, the Iowa caucuses, took place on
January 3rd, while the last, U tah's Republican primary, was held on June 26th.89 While
the outcome typically is not in doubt in June, this expanse of tim e allows the political
media to function almost like a sports netw ork covering a season. In the 2008 prim ary
cycle that featured highly competitive races for both party 's nom ination, there were
twenty-eight nights featuring at least one party 's prim ary or caucus.90 On each of these
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nights, the cable news networks could devote m uch or all of their attention to the 
election replete w ith innumerable banks of analysts and commentators.
Since prim ary contests for the m ost part now have a direct im pact upon the 
nom ination competition, they are decidedly new sw orthy events the m edia can use to 
attract viewers. In recent years this appears to be quite helpful to their short-term 
ratings. The major cable news networks, CNN, MSNBC and Fox News, experienced a 
year of "explosive audience growth" in 2008, up  sixty-nine, eighty-tw o and forty 
percent respectively in average prim e-tim e viewership com pared to 2007.91 After the 
general election in November 2008, the netw orks lost fifty, forty-one and forty percent 
respectively of their audiences.92
T h e  P o l i t i c i a n  /  P u n d i t  M u d d l e
In addition to their seemingly symbiotic relationship, the line betw een the media
and the candidates they cover has become increasingly blurry in recent years. To fill 
their numberless banks of commentators, the m edia has invested heavily in former and 
perhaps future presidential candidates. A cyclical relationship has developed between 
the two, as political figures and m edia pundits have become som ew hat interchangeable. 
This arrangem ent is m utually beneficial for the netw ork and the potential candidates; 
the networks can draw  viewers w ith an exclusive hold over a potential presidential 
candidate and the prospective candidates have not only a paying job, bu t also a forum
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to increase their public profile w hether they decide to seek the presidential nom ination 
or not.93 Fox News alone during the invisible prim ary em ployed five widely rum ored 
potential candidates for the Republican nomination, affording them  a significant 
advantage according to some of their rivals.94
CNN meanwhile has been accused of providing such an effective platform for 
Wesley Clark to ingratiate himself to the Am erican public that he w as in essence "the 
presidential candidate CNN built."95 As a former NATO commander, CNN ensured that 
Clark was ubiquitous on their netw ork to explain w hat was happening at the beginning 
of the Iraq War in 2003, appearing every day from March 19th to April 12th.96 This 
am ount of exposure to the public as a prestigious military m ind was essentially free 
advertising, availing Clark of the expensive and time-consuming task of introducing 
himself to the vast majority of the country w hen he launched his presidential bid in 
2004. 97
T h e  P e r r y  C a m p a i g n ' s  " O o p s "
Many might assume that a particularly unsuccessful or gaffe-filled campaign
could expose the weakness or lack of aptitude of a candidate and leave them  worse than 
before the experience. They could appear crazy, stupid or m ean and tarnish an 
otherwise relatively good public profile. The combination of an increasingly rigorous 
electoral calendar and an increasingly om nipresent media w ould  seem to make this
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even more likely. Such was the case of Rick Perry, w ho entered the 2012 Republican 
prim ary w ith m uch fanfare as a strong conservative alternative to M itt Romney. Yet 
Perry quickly began to disappoint, suffering through cam paign gaffes and poor debate 
performances, most notably being unable to rem em ber a key aspect of his governm ent 
reform agenda and offering a sheepish "oops."98 Perry's meteoric rise to conservative 
hero w as only matched by his calamitous fall from grace and quick exit from the 
prim ary race w ith nothing to show for his effort b u t a sullied reputation.
One m ight think that prospective candidates should take heed of Perry's 
example, as it w ould appear that a less substantial candidate can suffer in the trial by 
fire of a prim ary cycle. But Perry's example increasingly seems like the exception rather 
than the rule, and seems to be a result of poor preparation and "unforced errors" on 
Perry's part rather than a reflection of a highly scrutinizing system. N or does it appear 
that the damage to his reputation w as so bad  as to preclude future forays into 
presidential politics as Perry ponders launching a b id  for the 2016 nom ination.99
P u r v e y o r s  o f  E n t e r t a i n m e n t  N o t
S t r i n g e n t  E x a m i n a t i o n
Despite his embarrassment, Perry 's fortunes have not been irrevocably dam aged
because the m odern spectacle prim ary is not conducive to rigorous investigation of a
candidate's merits. This is because the media, w ho present the spectacle prim ary to the
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public, are far more concerned w ith their ow n self-interest than being exacting 
inquisitors. W hether this is readership or ratings or site visits, the richness and depth  of 
media organization's political coverage is at best a secondary concern. Indeed, one 
could plausibly make the argum ent that in delivering perfunctory political information 
the media is merely delivering w hat the public wants. While audiences claim they 
desire more substantial debate topics, the ratings indicate that fewer people watch w hen 
more substantial questions are featured.100 This environm ent of vapid  political coverage 
can reduce the cost of entry for candidates because a m edia prim arily interested in 
entertainm ent is largely content to traffic in insubstantial coverage w ith broad appeal. 
Therefore they are far less likely to thoroughly scrutinize candidates and reveal their 
contradictions or absurdities.
T h e  C o n f l u e n c e  o f  P r i m a r y  R e f o r m  a n d  
M e d i a  E x p a n s i o n
The contemporaneous developm ent of the spectacle prim ary system and the 
m odern political media have created an environm ent rife w ith ever-increasing 
opportunities for participants in the presidential primaries. The current prim ary system 
is an extraordinarily lengthy process, m ade im portant by its direct im pact on the 
outcome of the nom ination race and its ceaseless coverage by the media. It is a peerless 
arena for candidates to present themselves to the public and garner their attention and
39
esteem. W ithout both of these essential elements, candidates w ould have few 
foreseeable opportunities for personal gain from participation in a presidential prim ary 
alone.
4 0
Chapter III - Typology
T h e  V i a b l e  P a r t i c i p a n t s  a n d  T y p o l o g y  
M e t h o d o l o g y
T h e  S i m i l a r i t i e s  o f  P r e c e d i n g  C a r e e r s
Applying the standard for viability m entioned above, sixty-two unsuccessful
prim ary participants emerge from 1976-2008. The vast majority have traced remarkably
similar career paths preceding their nom ination bids. While any native-born American
citizen over the age of thirty-five is eligible to run  for President, understandably most
who do so have previously attained major elected office on the federal or state level.
The most common previous governm ental jobs am ongst viable prim ary participants are
member of the House of Representatives, Senator or Governor.
An ubiquitous common thread am ongst them  is the legal profession; almost all
of the sixty-two candidates at one point in their careers w orked as an attorney or
attended law school. For many, the legal profession acts as a convenient m eans of
making m oney during interludes betw een elected offices or after their retirem ent from
public life. Another remarkably common field for former presidential candidates is the
academic field. Many former prim ary participants have advanced degrees in political
science or economics or law, but they are not required for a candidate to make use of
their practical political experience to find em ploym ent as at least a visiting professor.
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Some, such as Fred Harris, have m aintained long-term positions in academia; he has 
been a professor of political science at the University of New  Mexico for thirty-seven 
years. The more common path is epitom ized by John Anderson, w ho taught in seven 
different positions in seventeen years after his unsuccessful attem pt at the Republican 
nomination in 1980.
C a n d i d a t e  T r i c h o t o m y
All of the candidate em ploym ent before a prim ary bid can be broken dow n into a
rough trichotomy: candidates who are serving major elected officeholders, those who 
are former major elected officeholders and  those w ho had not held elected office. W hat 
this w ork is primarily interested in, however, is the personal outcomes of these 
candidates after their prim ary bids in order to understand the effect of their prim ary 
participation. Here the population has m ore variance, m aking it difficult to categorize 
quite as neatly as preceding career arcs. But here too we can create a broad trichotomy 
of candidate subsequent career outcomes: those w ith careers prim arily in  the public 
sector, those w ith careers primarily in the private sector, and those w ith no apparent 
significant careers.
Categorizing the candidates in this w ay yields eight distinct typologies of 




Primarily Public Primarily Private None Apparent
The Kennedy Group The Dodd Group The Edwards/Hunter 
Group
Bayh, Birch Kemp, Jack Church, Frank Edw ards, John
Bentsen, Lloyd Simon, Paul Anderson, John B. H unter, Duncan
Byrd, Robert Harkin, Tom Baker, H ow ard
Humphrey, H ubert Alexander, Lam ar Kerrey, Bob





Udall, Mo McCain, John Dodd, Chris
Wallace, George Lieberman, Joe Richardson, Bill
Crane, Phil Biden, Joe Hart, Gary
Kennedy, Edward 
Cranston, Alan
Clinton, H illary 
Paul, Ron
G ephardt, Dick
Glenn, John Brown, Jerry
Dole, Bob Kucinich, Dennis
■ , Gore, A1
The Reagan/Bush Group The Huckabee Group The Gravel/Tsongas 
Group
Reagan, Ronald Harris, Fred Gravel, Mike





d u  Pont, Pete
Bradley, Bill
Governors/ Braun, Carol M oselsy
Mayors Dean, H ow ard
Giuliani, Rudy
* Huckabee, Mike
. Thom pson, Fred
Romney, Mitt
The Buchanan Group The LaRouche/ 
McCormack /
Shriver, Sargant LaRouche, Lyndon










Left colum n is the candidate's career prior to their presidential bid, the top row is career after 
bid. For methodology, see above
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and subsequent careers of the group as a whole. First we begin w ith candidates w ho 
were serving Congressmen, Senators or Governors at the time of their presidential run.
T h e  G r o u p s
T h e  T e d  K e n n e d y  G r o u p
This largest type of candidates follow the m ost traditional career arc whereby
they seek their party 's presidential nom ination only after establishing themselves as
major elected officeholders. Following their failure to garner the nomination, these
candidates have largely stayed in governm ental positions of one form or another for the
rest of their careers. Many of them, especially in  earlier historical electoral cycles,
returned to their Senate seat and served there for some time w ithout ever again
appearing in presidential contests or on a presidential ticket.
Edw ard Kennedy is a good exem plar of this group as a whole. The unlikely
patriarch of the Kennedy family w as elected to the Senate in 1962, overcoming the
contention that his family name was his only real asset.102 Kennedy rem ained in the
Senate for some time, ultimately declining to run  for president in 1972 and 1976 despite
massive pressure to do so following the deaths of his brothers John F. Kennedy and
Robert F. Kennedy.103 But in 1980, he took the highly unusual step of challenging the
sitting president in a primary, hoping to oust Jimmy Carter as the Democratic
presidential candidate. Despite C arter's unpopularity, Kennedy was ultimately
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unsuccessful in this endeavor and returned to the Senate, w here he rem ained for the 
next twenty-nine years until his death in 2009. There are m any other sim ilar examples in 
this large group, though most had far less m em orable forays into presidential politics 
than Kennedy. Robert Byrd, Richard Lugar and Tom Harkin are similar prim ary 
entrants, long-serving Senate stalwarts venturing into presidential politics once before 
resolving to retain their legislative role for m any years.
This w ould seem to indicate that perhaps m any candidates see no appreciable 
benefit to their careers as a result of their failed presidential nom ination bids. This is a 
possibility, b u t there is an equally plausible w ay of explaining these outcomes. A failed 
presidential nom ination bid may help stabilize and fortify one's hold  on their current 
office. For instance, it seems possible that the unsuccessful bids of lesser-known 
Senators somewhat earlier in their careers like Lugar and H arkin contributed to the 
endurance of their Senate careers. While their careers did not exactly advance, they 
m aintained their highly prestigious elected office for some time w hen they otherwise 
may have not.
Furthermore, not all of the candidates in this group merely m aintained their 
earlier positions in government. A sub-set of candidates, dissim ilar from Kennedy, Byrd 
and Lugar, reappeared in later presidential election cycles. Six candidates in this group 
w ould later become presidential or vice-presidential nominees: Lloyd Bentsen, Bob 
Dole, A1 Gore, Jack Kemp, John McCain and Joe Biden. This subset has very similar
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preceding careers as the "Senate stalw arts" sub-group, indeed each of these six served 
in the Senate. But their successful advance later in their careers to their party 's 
presidential ticket could indicate that perhaps having previously ru n  for President can 
be beneficial to one's later political career.
In this list in general, and especially am ongst the subset of "Senate stalwarts," a 
disproportionate am ount of candidates emerge from earlier in electoral history. Only 
seven candidates who ran for President in 1996 and after fit in this group and of those 
seven, four did return indefinitely to their previous public jobs b u t the other three, John 
McCain, Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, have all advanced to a presidential ticket or a 
cabinet post following their unsuccessful nom ination bids. The tendency of more recent 
candidates to ply their trade in the private sector and the advancem ent of those who 
stayed in public life seems to indicate that the trend of nom ination cam paigns being 
beneficial is increasing over time.
T h e  D o d d  G r o u p
A smaller group of candidates, nine of the total sixty-two, followed similar
preceding career paths as their colleagues in the Kennedy group. But these candidates 
pursued their careers after their nom ination bid principally outside of government. 
They have had diverse em ploym ent including running the New  School in NY, CEO of
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the MPAA, contributor to Fox News, creating one's own lobbying firm and of course the 
omnipresent legal profession (see A ppendix A for more specifics).
There seem to be few differences betw een these candidates and the Kennedy 
group to explain their pursuit of private employment. We cannot know conclusively, 
but it seems likely that similar private sector opportunities w ould be available to those 
of the Kennedy group if they had chosen that path  rather than m aintaining or 
advancing their governmental careers. M any of these candidates m ade their 
presidential bids towards the end of their careers, though not necessarily later in their 
lives.
Chris Dodd is a good example of the m em bers of this group. D odd had  a similar 
preceding career path as many of the m em bers of the Kennedy group. In fact the 
resemblance between Dodd and Joe Biden is pretty striking. They are almost the same 
age, both represented north-eastern states in the Senate, Biden for thirty-six years, Dodd 
for thirty, and they conducted relatively forgettable bids tow ards the end of their careers 
for the Democratic presidential nom ination in 2008.
The crucial difference between the two is that Biden w as selected as Obam a's 
running mate and became Vice-President while D odd returned to the Senate to finish 
his term, declined to seek reelection, and is now  head of the MPAA w ith a reported 
salary of $1.5 million.104 If Obama had m ade a different choice and Biden were not Vice-
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President, there is a strong possibility he too w ould have served ou t the rest of his term 
through 2014 and then retire w ith similar private sector opportunities as Dodd.
It is entirely possible that the candidates of this type were not denied a career in 
the public sector if they had wished it. Indeed, only one of the nine candidates, Frank 
Church, left the office he held w hen he ran for president due to electoral defeat.105 Bill 
Richardson was term-limited from retaining the governorship of N ew Mexico and 
therefore obligated to leave. But the other seven voluntarily chose retirem ent from the 
public sector and employment in the private.
T h e  E d w a r d s / H u n t e r  G r o u p
A m uch smaller set of candidates, two of the total sixty-two candidates, were
active political figures at the time of their run  bu t had no career in  governm ent nor any 
discernible coherent one in the private sector after their presidential bids. However, 
both of these candidates participated in recent prim ary cycles and may still have a 
future in the political or private sector.
John Edw ards in likely only in this category for legal reasons; even w ith his 
profile in tatters following his highly public affair and divorce from his now-deceased 
wife Elizabeth, Edwards w ould likely have returned to his quite lucrative legal 
profession or a lobbying position if he had  not been occupied w ith  defending himself
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against legal charges and possible im prisonm ent since his last attem pt to w in the 
presidential nom ination in 2008.
It is less clear why Duncan H unter has not at least ostensibly parlayed his 
Congressional service and presidential run  into a new  career opportunity  in  the public 
or private sector. He has spent significant time supporting the ultim ately successful 
candidacy of his son to take over his old Congressional seat. Perhaps time will change 
his status bu t as of now  he does no t properly fit in  either category. While a majority of 
candidates serve in public office at the time of their presidential run, a smaller bu t 
significant am ount of candidates have formerly held such positions and reintegrate 
themselves into politics through the presidential primary.
T h e  R e a g a n / B u s h  G r o u p
A very small am ount of candidates, two of the total sixty-two, unsuccessfully
sought the presidency as former major officeholders and subsequently returned to a 
largely public career. These two candidates, Ronald Reagan and  George H. W. Bush, 
returned to public life through the presidency in later electoral cycles. Reagan had left 
office as Governor of California shortly before his first foray into the prim ary process in 
1976. Reagan was nom inated for President in the next prim ary cycle in 1980 and was 
successful in the general election.
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George H. W. Bush had left Congress almost a decade before his first presidential 
bid in 1980 and had occupied various posts in the executive branch until the beginning 
of the Jimmy Carter administration. Following the two-term  presidency of Ronald 
Reagan and eight years as his vice-president, Bush was himself nom inated and elected 
President in 1988.
T h e  H u c k a b e e  G r o u p
While Reagan and Bush were ultim ately successful in their presidential
aspirations, not a single other former major elected office-holder candidate attained any
public post after their presidential bid. In fact, the vast majority of former major elected-
official candidates returned to the private sector after their prim ary defeat; eleven of the
total sixty-two candidates fit this description.
Mike Huckabee is a good example of this type of candidate. Huckabee served as
Governor of Arkansas from 1996 until 2007, announcing his intention to run  for
president not long after his departure as governor. While not attaining the Republican
presidential nomination, Huckabee did rather well in his presidential bid and shortly
thereafter secured a relatively lucrative job w ith Fox News.
The trend of this group tow ards private sector careers stands in stark contrast to
the long list of serving candidates w ho m aintain prim arily public careers after their
presidential bids. This disparity makes intuitive sense; unlike their serving
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counterparts, unsuccessful candidates in presidential nom ination contests w ho are not 
still actively in government have no elected office to fall back to. Still, it seems 
somewhat strange that not a single former elected officeholder candidate has returned 
to public life except those two who successfully secured the presidency.
It is unclear whether they have voluntarily chosen to rem ain outside of public life 
or if the benefits of participation in the prim ary process do not extend to being elected 
to public office after one's presidential bid. It w ould seem that these candidates w ith 
typically relatively high name-recognition w ould be able to secure positions in the 
House of Representatives or perhaps even the Senate if they w anted. It seems likely that 
they instead prefer their newfound private careers to a return to the lower rungs of 
public employment.
T h e  G r a v e l  /  T s o n g a s  G r o u p
Two former presidential candidates, Mike Gravel and Paul Tsongas, comprise the
very small group of former major elected officeholder candidates who have had no 
discernible private or public careers since their presidential bid. Paul Tsongas had few 
opportunities to cultivate any type of career after his presidential bid because he 
tragically died of cancer about four years after his presidential bid.
Mike Gravel pursued a rather bizarre presidential cam paign in  2008 and 
subsequently has apparently been filling his time w ith quite eclectic pursuits. After his
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w ithdraw al from the Democratic prim aries in early 2008, Gravel switched to the 
Libertarian Party, has defended a Palestinian-American activist, publicly defended 
Sarah Palin, and become quite active in  a the "9/11 tru th  & justice m ovem ent," w ith one 
part of that movement now accusing him  of absconding w ith some of the organization's 
money in early 2010.106 While it is obviously a small sample size, it seems plausible that 
Gravel's unorthodox presidential cam paign did not benefit him  personally nor the 
health of his m ovement and ideology. However, Gravel only barely m et the threshold of 
viability in his campaign, and this lack of ostensible benefit m ay be a function of this 
lack of visibility. Furthermore, if Gravel does in  fact has a coherent ideology to advance, 
it is a difficult one to discern.
Despite his oddities, Gravel was a som ew hat traditionalist candidate at least in 
background because he had been a Senator from Alaska before his presidential run  in 
2008. The vast majority of viable presidential candidates fit this intuitive m old of a 
current or former major elected officeholder. Yet some candidates have emerged onto 
the presidential scene w ithout ever before holding elected office.
It appears that running for a president as an "outsider" candidate w ho had never 
before held public office can yield benefits in the private sector bu t not in the public 
sector. No candidate who had not previously held major elected office has pursued a 
primarily public career afterwards. It is not clear w hether this is a choice of the 
candidates, who may not be interested in public careers, or perhaps the benefit they
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derived from the presidential prim ary process does not lend itself to helping them be 
elected w hen they never have before. In any event, it appears candidates cannot or will 
not "jump the ladder" by running for president to set up  a career of service in a lower 
elected position. Rather than lives prim arily spent in public service, these kind of 
candidates largely return to the private sector for employment.
T h e  B u c h a n a n  G r o u p
While the majority of presidential candidates have previously held elected office,
it is by no means required for a candidate to establish themselves as viable and reap the 
benefits of prim ary participation. Nine such candidates had  never held elected office 
bu t nevertheless later emerged as viable candidates for the presidential nomination. 
None of these candidates had traditionally political backgrounds before or since their 
failed presidential candidacy. The two closest candidates w ith political backgrounds are 
Sargent Shriver and Alan Keyes, since they had  both previously served relatively minor 
roles in the executive branch. Wesley Clark had  an undeniable public career background 
as a high-ranking military officer, bu t a position in  the m ilitary is an wholly different 
experience than being an elected officer of the government.
Some of the candidates derive from a background of fervent religious and social 
advocacy, such as Pat Robertson, Gary Bauer, A1 Sharpton and Jesse Jackson. Each of 
these candidates are themselves m em bers of the clergy or have had  close ties w ith
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religious organizations. Jesse Jackson was the m ost serious of these candidates, 
emerging as a very plausible nominee for the Democratic Party in 1984 and 1988. The 
other three were far less plausible candidates, w ho likely entered the presidential 
prim aries in order to bolster public attention of their m ost cherished issues rather than 
harboring legitimate beliefs that they w ould garner their party 's  nom ination.
Since these candidates have had  no previous electoral experience, it makes a 
good deal of sense that they appear to have a som ew hat more tenuous attachm ent to 
the major political parties. Two of these candidates, Pat Buchanan and Alan Keyes, not 
only sought the Republican presidential nom ination bu t sought the presidency via a 
third party  candidacy. Wesley Clark also reportedly equivocated on which party  he 
w ould join w hen planning his entry into politics and was accused by some of choosing 
the Democratic Party only because it w as the party  w ith an open com petition for its 
presidential nominee.107 It seems safe to say that this type of candidate w ithout previous 
experience in elected office is far more of an opportunist than the "Senate stalwart" 
type. This group of candidates w ith no previous experience in elected office and 
prim arily private post-bid careers is not, however, the m ost quixotic type of candidate.
T h e  L a R o u c h e / M c C o r m a c k  G r o u p
The final group consists of only two candidates, both of w hom  exist on the
furtherm ost fringe of viability. Neither had  political experience of any kind before their
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presidential bids and neither have had  any discernible public or private careers in  a 
typical way since. Lyndon LaRouche has held no elected office and  has not participated 
in the private sector in any traditional sense since his m any presidential runs both as a 
Democrat and an Independent. Rather he is more interested it appears in consolidating 
and expanding his rather perplexing organization that bears a significant resemblance 
to a cult.
While LaRouche's presidential aspirations seem to be an exercise in indulging his 
own megalomania, Ellen McCormack's foray into presidential politics was fueled by 
her fervent idealism. She had never held a job in either the public or private sector and 
proudly trum peted her status as a housewife w hen seeking the Democratic nom ination 
for President in 1976 on a platform largely based upon her vehem ent opposition to 
abortion.108 McCormack was relatively successful enough to qualify for federal 
matching funds, a result that so dism ayed some critics, who alleged m atching funds 
were never intended for single-issue candidacies, that the law  was subsequently 
changed to raise the threshold for federal m atching funds.109 Despite raising an 
impressive am ount of money, McCormack came nowhere close to capturing the 
nomination or even challenging the eventual w inner Jimmy Carter. In fact, unlike some 
more recent quixotic outsider candidates, she never became very publicly renowned; 
her own next-door neighbor was reportedly unaw are she was running for President.110 
Yet her candidacy at the beginning of the post-reform prim ary era presaged the rise of
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those presidential candidates with little electoral hope bu t w ith zealous belief in  a single 
issue or a broader ideology.
O v e r a r c h i n g  T r e n d s
E x t r a - Q u i x o t i c  O u t s i d e r s
From these groupings of candidates and their career outcomes, we can come to
some general conclusions. Firstly, neither party  has ever nom inated a candidate for
President w ithout previously holding elected office; apart from Jesse Jackson's attem pts
in 1984 and 1988, no such candidate has even come close. Therefore these candidacies
outwardly m ight appear to be unsuccessful com pared to their com patriots of other
types. Yet some of these candidacies are not necessarily failures because they did not
succeed or come close to securing their party 's nom ination. The spectacle prim ary
process offers the opportunity for exposure of not just candidates, bu t their ideologies.
These are the kind of politicians w ho pursue w hat can be term ed "single-issue
candidacies," political campaigns fixated upon the advocacy of a single policy. While
the vast majority of these types of candidates exist on the furthest-m ost fringes of
relevancy in a presidential primary, their failure can theoretically bring more attention
to their cherished issue. Since 1976, there have been tw o clear "single-issue candidates"
who have garnered enough support to cross the viability threshold, Ellen McCormack
in 1976 and Gary Bauer in 2000. Both candidates focused their cam paigns upon their
opposition to abortion, attem pting to use the presidential nom ination process to 
advance their viewpoint in the public mind. It is questionable however, w hether they 
had any success in their endeavor to advance their ideas. These tw o candidates only 
barely passed the threshold of viability and have left a far from  indelible m ark upon 
electoral history.
R u n , T h e n  R u n  A g a i n
Several of the viable candidates sought their party 's presidential nom ination in
multiple election cycles. Some, like Ronald Reagan and M itt Romney, were successful in
their second attempt. But eleven others sought their party 's  nom ination on m ultiple
occasions and were never successful. O utsider candidates w ho had  no t previously held
elected office are over-represented am ongst these candidates; of the eleven "m ultiple
runners," five of them are candidates w ith no previous experience in elected office.111
Given that candidates with no previous experience w ith elected office in governm ent
tend to have very remote prospects of securing the nomination, it appears that outsider
candidates are more willing to use their candidacy in the prim aries as a vehicle for their
other aspirations.
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N e g l i g i b l e  A b s o l u t e  C a r e e r  R i s k
It seems logical that participation in the prim ary system does not benefit each
candidate equally. And indeed there is a w ide am ount of variance in  post-bid outcomes 
for candidates both between and w ithin the candidate types. But almost all of the 
candidates, fifty-six of the total sixty-two, had  a discernible post-bid career either in the 
public or the private sector. There are reasonable explanations for the remaining six's 
lack of careers, ranging from criminal indictm ent to untim ely death.
The w orst case scenario of participating in a presidential prim ary does not 
appear to be bad as one m ight assume. It is possible that a poor prim ary performance 
can do some damage to one's reputation, b u t it is extremely rare that it does such 
irreparable damage that it will preclude a failed candidate from pursuing  a worthwhile 
subsequent career. Even candidates who barely established themselves as viable 
participants in the prim ary had jobs of one kind or another. Especially in the private 
sector, the historical record dem onstrates that there are extensive and diverse 
opportunities for a former presidential candidate of any type.
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Figure 3.2











Serving Congressmen/ 76-'88 16 5 0
Senators/Governors | ’92-'08 9 4 2
Former Congressmen/Senators/ 76-'88 2 3 0
Governors/Mayors '92-'08 0 8 2
Hadn't Held Elected Office
76-'88 0 3 1
’92-'08 o ! 6 1
TOTALS
76-'88 18 11 1
'92-'08 9 18 : s. . ;
Left colum n is the candidate's career prior to their presidential bid, the
F r o m  P u b l i c  P o s t - R u n  C a r e e r s  t o  P r i v a t e
Given the continued evolution of the spectacle prim ary from 1976 to the present,
it is possible that the candidates participating in these prim aries have changed as well 
over time. If one splits the candidates roughly in half by the time they ran for 
President112, w hat results is a early period (1976-1988) w ith thirty candidates and a later 
period (1992-2008) w ith thirty-two candidates. There is a small difference in the 
preceding career arcs of the viable prim ary participants; in the early period twenty-one 
candidates were serving major elected officeholders, com pared to fifteen in the later 
period and five candidates from the early period were major form er elected 
officeholders, compared to ten in the later period.
But while the preceding career types appear to have not significantly changed 
over time, there is a more clear difference in the post-prim ary outcomes of the
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candidates between periods. In the earlier period, eighteen candidates returned to the 
public sector after their failed prim ary candidacies, while nine pursued  a career mainly 
in the private sector. In the later period, this trend has almost reversed itself, as eleven 
candidates have largely remained in governm ent and eighteen have left for private 
employment.
These findings appear to indicate that a gradual historical shift is taking place in 
tandem  with the evolution of the spectacle primary. While the spectacle prim ary system 
offers the potential for benefits in the private or public sectors, an increasing am ount of 
the viable candidates in each prim ary cycle are seeking to apply these advantages in the 
private sector rather than the public. W hy this is occurring is unclear, bu t it is a trend 
that seems to be continuing in the m ost recent electoral cycle in 2012, as only two of the 
viable participants in the Republican nom ination presently w ork in  the public sector.
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Chapter IV - The Private Sector
G r o w i n g  P s e u d o - P o l i t i c a l  O p p o r t u n i t i e s  O u t s i d e  o f  
G o v e r n m e n t
Should a failed prim ary candidate not be able or not wish to continue their life in 
politics, their status as a former presidential candidate will serve them  well in securing 
gainful em ploym ent in the private sector. Far from being forced into an early retirement, 
unsuccessful prim ary candidates have an ample opportunity  for robust private careers.
As m entioned above, an increasing am ount of prim ary entrants over time have 
entered the private sector following their prim ary bid, perhaps because the spectacle 
prim ary continues to evolve and offer ever-increasing chances for its participants to 
bolster their public profile. But in addition to the process lending itself increasingly to 
private sector post-bid employment, the num ber of opportunities have increased 
because since the 1970s there has been a m arked growth in the "pseudo-political" part 
of the private sector. While these kinds of jobs are not in governm ent, they interact w ith 
the political process and owe their existence to it. In some cases, an applicant's 
reputation is a better a job qualification than actual aptitude.
Positions in lobbying firms, in the m edia as pundits, in think-tanks and in law 
firms are abundant in the Washington area. These types of jobs offer an immediate 
venue for former presidential candidates to exploit their fame and persona for personal 
gain. From the prospective of these organizations, it makes sense to hire well-known
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lobbyists whose reputation will result in public attention or the successful convincing 
of political figures. Former presidential candidates offer a natural choice in this regard 
and the historical record indicates that a considerable am ount of candidates who 
immediately leave public life take up  this kind of employment. However, these types of 
jobs are not the only means for a candidate to benefit themselves in the private sector. 
As the opportunities have increased in number, they have also diversified in kind.
W e s l e y  C l a r k ' s  S o j o u r n  i n  P o l i t i c s
One way to try to isolate the effect of prim ary participation as m uch as possible
is to remove previous government service as the principal explanatory variable for a
former prim ary entrant being well-suited to outside employment. We can do this by
looking at a candidate who did not in fact ever hold elected office before their failed
presidential bid. Very few people have become viable candidates for a major party 's
presidential nom ination w ithout previously holding major public office. Perhaps the
most cogent is a recent example, General Wesley Clark, w ho sought the Democratic
nom ination for President in 2004. Clark w as som ew hat well-known as a m ilitary figure;
he had been a relatively high-profile com m anding general of NATO during its
involvement in the Yugoslavian Wars of the 1990s. His potential entry into politics was
m arked w ith substantial buildup and m uch speculation about his political beliefs and
party preference; Clark eventually declared his allegiance for the Democratic Party.113
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Media and popular reaction were initially quite ebullient and some saw Clark as a 
present-day Eisenhower.114
Yet Clark was ultimately unable to secure the Democratic presidential 
nomination, finishing fourth in the national prim ary vote behind eventual nominee 
John Kerry, John Edwards and H ow ard Dean. Clark's late entry, fundraising deficit and 
some concerns about his readiness for the job w ithout any political experience 
conspired to doom his candidacy. Clark w on only a single prim ary contest, Oklahoma, 
and his campaign was largely seen as a disappointm ent. But crucially, the media had 
initially been infatuated w ith Clark and his public profile was far higher than it had 
been before his foray into the presidential nom ination process.
During the interlude between his retirem ent as NATO com m ander and his 
presidential bid, Clark had found em ploym ent as a "corporate consultant" for the 
Stephens Group, a holding company ow ned by a family from Clark's hom etow n of 
Little Rock, Arkansas.115 His com pensation is not public, bu t we can infer that he likely 
was relatively well-paid. But since his presidential b id  and the exposure it bestowed 
upon him, Clark has experienced m uch greater personal success; he has founded his 
own lobbying firm, Wesley K. Clark & Associates, about which little inform ation is 
public except that Clark draws upon his "expertise, relationships, and extensive 
international experience" to advance the interests of his clients.116 In addition, he has 
served as Vice Chairm an and Senior Advisor to James Lee W itt Associates LLC, an
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emergency readiness and response corporation.117 He also serves as a m em ber on the 
Board of Advisors for Geooptics LLC, an environm ental data delivery com pany118 and 
serves as co-Chairman of Growth Energy, an organization w ho "represent the producers 
and supporters of ethanol."119 In a more definitive dem onstration of his public visibility, 
Clark was selected in 2012 to host a NBC program  called "Stars Earn Stripes," wherein 
he draw s upon his military background to help shepherd celebrities through mock 
military missions.120
Clark's career prospects m arkedly im proved following his presidential run 
compared to his brief career after his retirem ent from the m ilitary bu t before his prim ary 
bid. He w ent from relatively low-profile em ploym ent as a "corporate consultant" to a 
correspondent for CNN while rum ors swirled about his potential candidacy, to being 
involved in three private companies, one of which he founded and owns, and hosting a 
high-profile show on television after his unsuccessful bid. Despite this lack of electoral 
experience, Clark was able to parlay his failed prim ary bid into a diverse private career.
M i k e  H u c k a b e e ' s  " R e a l l y , R e a l l y , W o n d e r f u l . . . F o x  
G i g "
While Clark had never held elected office, he was relatively fam ous for a career 
solider as the former head of NATO and for his extensive appearances on cable 
television. Mike Huckabee, on the other hand, w as not know n w idely at a national level 
at all at the conclusion of tenure as Governor of Arkansas in 2007. To be sure, he was
well-respected in his home state, bu t his national exposure w as mostly limited to 
interest in his dramatic weight loss.121
Almost immediately after his departure as governor of Arkansas, Huckabee 
launched a bid for the 2008 Republican presidential nom ination. He ran as a social 
conservative and had a good degree of success, capturing the Iowa caucuses and some 
southern primaries while emerging as the principal alternative to John McCain after the 
w ithdrawal of Mitt Romney. His charisma, impeccable conservative credentials and 
surprisingly strong showing m ade m any w onder after M cCain's defeat if Huckabee 
w ould be the Republican standard-bearer in  2012.
Huckabee quickly translated his new found political celebrity into apolitical 
employment by taking a position in the media. As discussed earlier, m edia coverage of 
the prim ary process has moved inexorably upw ard. The advent and  evolution of cable 
television in particular has created far m ore positions than in the earlier television era 
exclusively dom inated by network news program s.
Shortly after his w ithdraw al from the presidential nom ination race, Huckabee 
was hired by one of these cable new s organizations, Fox News, as an contributor. This 
alone is not an overly remarkable accom plishm ent for a national political figure. But not 
long thereafter, Fox News made a far m ore substantial investm ent by airing Huckabee, a 
weekly show hosted by its namesake. Huckabee became and remains a successful 
program, earning its host a reported annual salary of around a half a million dollars, in
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addition to the radio work Huckabee has been preform ing for Citadel Media.122 This 
income has allowed Huckabee to reportedly begin building a m ulti-million dollar 
vacation home in Florida.123
As the 2012 Republican prim ary field began to take shape, Huckabee seemed like 
a natural candidate given his strong showing in 2008, continued popularity, and ability 
to retain an audience in the media. But Huckabee in the end dem urred, saying, "all the 
factors say go, bu t my heart says no."124 This decision was not a surprise to some 
political commentators given Huckabee's effusive appreciation for his job on Fox News 
in an interview w ith Chris Wallace in 2009, saying specifically about his presidential 
decision, "the reason I w ouldn 't is because this Fox gig I've got right now, Chris, is 
really, really, w onderful."125 He was even more explicit about his personal financial 
considerations in a February 2011 conversation w ith reporters w hen he declared, "I 
need to make sure I'm  ready to give up  m y job to declare m y candidacy. The day I say, 
'I 'm  running,' that's the day I don't have an incom e."126
It is unclear if Huckabee simply was uninterested in becoming President or if he 
believed the risk to his personal finances was not w orth the potential rew ard of the 
presidency. In any event, Mike Huckabee provides us w ith an albeit anecdotal bu t also 
quite telling example of the opportunities available to a candidate despite not attaining 
any elected office since the end of his governorship. Because w hile Huckabee failed in 
his attem pt to w in the Republican nom ination for President in 2008, his relatively good
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showing and the positive reception of his attem pt yielded an impressive private sector 
career, one too good it appears for Huckabee to give up.
T i m  P a w l e n t y ' s  E p h e m e r a l  C a n d i d a c y  b u t  E n d u r i n g  
P e r s o n a l  S u c c e s s
While Mike Huckabee waged a long cam paign in 2008 and emerged as a serious
challenger to the eventual nominee John McCain, Tim Paw lenty's attem pt to secure the 
2012 Republican nom ination was remarkable for its brevity and lack of success. 
Pawlenty was rum ored as a possible candidate in 2008 bu t opted out of the contest. He 
did launch a bid for the 2012 nom ination in early 2011, resplendent w ith high 
production-value campaign ads and the prom ise of his rum ored candidacy in the 
previous election cycle.127
Pawlenty's campaign however could not match the presum ptions of his 
campaign ads. He placed enormous im portance on his perform ance in the Ames Straw 
Poll in A ugust 2011, almost six m onths before the first prim ary contest. While ostensibly 
a kind of early snap poll of prospective voters in the vital early-voting state of Iowa, the 
Ames Straw Poll is in reality a som ew hat farcical exercise that involves the essential 
purchasing of votes by candidates. Michelle Bachmann's victory in 2012 coupled w ith 
low -tum out convinced some Republicans that the event needed to be seriously 
reformed or abandoned entirely.128 Yet the outcome had a profound and deleterious 
effect upon Pawlenty, who had invested extensive resources and created great
expectations for victory in the straw  poll. His failure to do so coupled w ith his already 
relatively weak national position m eant that Bachmann's upset victory quickly became 
the coup de grace for Pawlenty's campaign. U pon his w ithdraw al, Pawlenty endorsed 
Mitt Romney and later served as the national co-chairman of his campaign. As in 2008, 
Pawlenty was considered as a running mate, bu t was ultim ately passed over.129
Despite his lack of success and having w ithdraw n from the nom ination process 
months before the first prim ary votes w ere cast, Paw lenty appears to have benefited 
from his nom ination experience just as other more enduring and successful failed 
candidates had. As an early endorser of Mitt Romney, Pawlenty was rew arded w ith a 
position as national co-chair of the Romney campaign. Yet he resigned this position 
before the general election was over after receiving an enticing private em ploym ent 
offer. He had accepted a position as head of The Financial Service Roundtable, a bank 
lobbying group, for the lucrative reported salary of $1.8 million.130 It is possible that he 
w ould have received this offer as a simple former Governor of M innesota, but it seems 
that his brief and rather disastrous foray into presidential politics w as at least somewhat 
helpful in raising his public profile and m ay have helped him  secure his new  lucrative 
position.
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T h e  S p e a k i n g  C i r c u i t
Shortly after announcing his intention to seek the 2012 Republican nomination,
Pawlenty came under some criticism for the release of an email by the agency 
representing him  as a paid speaker.131 This email, sent to potential corporate employers, 
openly capitalized upon Pawlenty's new  status as a presidential candidate and 
reiterated that he was nevertheless still available for paid speaking engagem ents.132 
Pawlenty faced some recriminations because presidential candidates customarily 
suspend their speaking engagement careers during their candidacies.133 However, 
w ithout any formal job after leaving the M innesota governorship, Pawlenty was 
apparently dependent upon his speaking engagem ent fees for income.134 The reporter of 
the story even speculated that the presidential bid was being used to facilitate his 
speaking engagements rather than the other w ay around.135
While the speaking engagement circuit is perhaps less w ell-know n em ploym ent 
than something like lobbying, participation is quite commonplace am ongst the more 
recent viable prim ary nominees. Following her departure from the State Departm ent, 
Hillary Clinton almost immediately joined the H arry Walker Agency, a group 
representing m any other prom inent figures, including her husband form er President 
Bill Clinton.136 This is expected to be a very lucrative venture for Clinton, w ith her fees 
approaching or surpassing six figures, m aking her among the highest-paid speakers of 
all the agency's clients.137 This makes sense given Clinton's celebrity as a former First 
Lady, Senator, presidential candidate and Secretary of State.
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But this does not mean that the lecture circuit is closed to less fam ous former 
politicians. The Harry Walker agency alone represents Clinton and ten other viable 
prim ary candidates from the post-reform  era.138 Even Mike Gravel, whose post-bid 
career has been extremely obscure to the point of non-existent, is available for speaking 
engagements through Harry Walker.139
The compensation for each person is not readily available, bu t it is a potentially 
lucrative avenue for former politicians to make some m oney w ith  relatively little effort. 
Mitt Romney came under some criticism for dism issing his reported speaking fees of 
$374,000 from February 2010 to February 2011 as "not very m uch."140 While this is a 
relatively inconsequential sum for someone of Romney's wealth, it could be a valuable 
revenue stream for a self-interested candidate following their departure from public life.
And while the vast majority of politicians available for speaking engagements 
through H arry Walker are not former prim ary candidates, those that are appear to make 
full use of this aspect of their biography. Alan Keyes's profile for instance, proudly 
trum pets at the very top that Keyes is a "3-Time Republican Presidential C andidate."141 
Nor is H enry Walker the only purveyor of form er presidential candidates to speak at 
any function willing to pay them. A nother group, Leading Authorities, represents 
former candidates Bob Dole, Gary Hart, Pat Buchanan and Tim Pawlenty.142
O n the other hand, the sheer num ber of active and form er political figures 
available for speaking engagements is staggering, and being a form er presidential
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nominee is by no means a prerequisite for inclusion in the group. M any candidates 
considering a presidential bid m ay already be sufficiently w ell-know n to gam er 
speaking engagements if they choose to pursue them. But judging by intuition and how  
eagerly the agencies trum pet the former presidential candidacies of some of their 
speakers, it w ould seem that being a former prim ary candidate can only help.
T h e  U b i q u i t o u s  P o l i t i c a l  B o o k
It is sometimes unclear w hether a candidate is using their speaking appearances 
to advance their presidential aspirations or the reverse. There can be similar confusion 
when dealing w ith published books w ritten by active or prospective presidential 
candidates. After the election is over, a candidate does not necessarily even have to rely 
upon being hired to capitalize upon  their public visibility; a book is a relatively easy 
way to do so independently.
Printed books are also an interesting phenom enon because they can be both a 
cause and symptom of a successful cam paign or public image. Books w ritten by 
presidential candidates are a useful tool because they allow a candidate to increase their 
name recognition and their intellectual gravitas. But in addition, books can be a useful 
alternative m eans of income for candidates before, during and after elections, whether 
they are successful campaigns or not (see A ppendix B for further details).
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T h e  C a m p a i g n  T o m e
In recent times it seems like everyone has their ow n book, and presidential
candidates in  particular have been quite the prolific authors. Of the fourteen "viable"
candidates in the 2008 Democratic and  Republican primaries, half produced at least one
w ritten w ork during their campaign or imm ediately before, all taking the form of either
a kind of political manifesto or m ore typically a rather self-serving autobiographical
venture. A good example of this k ind of m aterial is Mitt Rom ney's Turnaround: Crisis,
Leadership and the Olympic Games, w ritten in 2007. Even the decidedly m ore obscure
candidate Mike Gravel produced Citizen Power: A  Mandate for Change (2008). These
"campaign books" are useful as tools to advance the candidacy of their author. But they
also serve the practical benefit of earning money, albeit in some cases likely quite little,
and sales will likely recede once the prim ary is over and the author is no longer in the
public eye. These books w ould likely not have been w ritten in the first place or if they
were w ould have sold far fewer copies w ithout the exposure of their author to the
public through their pursuance of a presidential bid.
T h e  C a s h i n g - I n  B o o k
Perhaps even more prolific is the tendency for former presidential candidates to
cash in on their experiences after their defeat. Of those same fourteen 2008 unsuccessful
prim ary candidates, they have collectively published fifteen different books. Some, like
Mitt Romney's No Apology: The Case for American Greatness (2010) or Ron Paul's The
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Revolution (2009) were likely laying further groundw ork for their eventual renewed 
presidential bids in 2012. Yet others, like Teaching the Pig to Dance (2010), penned by Fred 
Thompson, appear to be more a straightforw ard attem pt to capitalize financially on his 
momentary rise in visibility as a result of his political campaign. It w ould seem that 
Thompson's memoir was far more plausible to be published in  2010 soon after his 
m oment in the sun in 2008. O n the other hand, Thom pson's w ork was dism issed rather 
harshly by the Wall Street Journal w ho surm ised from its content tha t Thom pson had no 
intention of running for office again and the w ork appears not to have been a 
spectacular commercial success.143 Yet Thom pson d id  get it published and likely made 
some am ount of money for his effort. Consensus opinion following Thom pson's ill- 
fated 2008 presidential nomination bid w as that he had dam aged his public reputation 
rather than advanced it and yet he w as still able to find a publisher for his memoir. We 
cannot know if he w ould have accomplished this as a mere form er senator had  he not 
run for President, but it seems likely that at the very least, his failed presidential bid and 
the added visibility it afforded him was a help rather than a hinderance.
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S i m u l t a n e o u s  P r o m o t i o n  o f  S e l f  a n d  
I d e a s
T h e  I d e o l o g i c a l  T r e a t i s e
Published books also provide the opportunity for fervent believers in political
theory or other causes to use their cam paign visibility to increase the am ount of people 
reading their works and thereby absorb their philosophy Ron Paul is a quite cogent 
example of this phenomenon. Supporters and opponents will agree that Ron Paul is a 
fervent believer in libertarianism, an ideological fram ework that generally favors a 
dramatically reduced role for governm ent in public life. Paul also considers himself an 
economic theorist, w ho sees himself as draw ing heavily upon the economic theory of 
Friedrich von Hayek and others from the A ustrian school of economics. Since 2007 
alone, just before Paul rose to national prom inence w ith his first b id  for the Republican 
Party's presidential nomination, Paul has authored or co-authored eight different 
works. But unlike Fred Thompson's memoir, these are not filled w ith self-serving 
autobiographical anecdotes but collectively take the form of a relatively radical 
manifesto.
Paul had  been the Libertarian candidate for President in 1988 bu t was a relatively 
unknow n Congressman from Texas w ho was largely alienated from his ow n party due 
to his contrarian libertarian views on key issues. But after his ultim ately unsuccessful 
bid for the Republican nomination in 2008, Paul became quite popular and well-known 
nationally. He himself noted that his candidacy and his books were not only an attem pt
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to w in elected office, but also to use his candidacy as a vehicle to advance the libertarian 
movem ent by bringing to the fore issues of im portance to him  and his followers.144 
Published w ritten works are a valuable tool for advancem ent because the varying 
motivations behind publishing books are not m utually exclusive; one can find benefits 
for their personal finances, their electoral future and the future of their ideology 
simultaneously.
S u p e r  P A C s a s  R e l e v a n c y  V e h i c l e
Books are not the only tool for the advancem ent of a political ideology or the
promotion of a politician's public profile. The advent of Super PACs and general loosing
of restrictions on money in politics has created new  vehicles to exert political influence
for anyone w ith money or the ability to shepherd it. Former presidential candidates
who no longer hold an official public position are in  an ideal position to take advantage
of the system which allows an organization to seamlessly translate from
"independently" promoting a candidate's presidential cam paign to being an outlet and
underw riter for their future political advocacy. These kinds of organizations create the
possibility for a former candidate to translate their ephem eral relevancy in a nom ination
contest into the possible enduring influence of their ideas or continued role for
themselves in the public debate.
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The 2012 presidential election was the first to feature Super PACs. Super PACs 
are allowed to solicit unlimited funding provided that they follow the rather byzantine 
restrictions on direct "coordination" w ith individual candidates. In  practice, this led to 
the creation of pseudo-official Super PACs for each presidential candidate in the 2012 
primaries, often led in fact by form er staffers or aides or other associates of a candidate. 
Despite ostensibly abiding by the restriction on coordination w ith  the candidate, in 
practice these groups act largely in concert w ith their de facto sponsor candidate.
Like all the other major 2012 nom ination candidates, Rick Santorum  had a 
pseudo-official Super PAC; his w as called the Red, White and Blue Fund. Despite their 
earlier protests to the contrary, this group will now  concede that the organization was 
founded w ith the purpose of supporting Rick Santorum 's presidential cam paign.145 
U pon his exit from the Republican nom ination race, Santorum  w as able to combine his 
own strictly political organization, Rick Santorum  for President, w ith  the Red, White 
and Blue Fund.146 This new kind of bifurcated organization can prom ote causes, cover 
Santorum 's expenses related to his advocacy and donate m oney to  candidates Santorum 
supports.147 In this way, the new political organizations can serve as both a bankroller of 
a former candidate's post-election political lifestyle and an amplifier of their political 
beliefs and public profile. The money can be used to air issue-specific commercials and 
can allow Santorum to exert influence by channeling the m oney to candidates he 
supports in prim ary or general elections.
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However, Santorum appears to be the only 2012 presidential candidate to make 
use of this opportunity. Many of the candidate-specific Super PACs now  have no 
connection to their preferred candidate and if still active are clutching after some 
purpose following the presidential election.148 Super PACs are such a new  element in 
presidential politics that it is quite possible that future presidential candidates also 
decide to capitalize on this newly legal organizational chicanery.
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Chapter V - The Public Sector
A large and increasing am ount of unsuccessful presidential prim ary entrants 
have gone on to utilize the benefits of prim ary participation in the private sector. But 
w hat of the candidates who do not go on to ply their trade in  the private sector? Is this a 
beneficial effect only applicable to those w ho leave governm ent after their attem pt at 
the presidential nomination?
While it is not always as recognizable as those who move to the private sector, 
those who stay on in government appear to also commonly benefit from their prim ary 
participation. A nd while an increasing num ber of former candidates over time have 
sought em ploym ent in the private sector, a plurality of prim ary participants since 1976 
have spurned such usually more lucrative em ploym ent outside of governm ent to 
m aintain careers in the public sector after their presidential bid.
An unsuccessful presidential candidate m ight seem likely to be cast into the 
political wilderness after their prim ary defeat. A nd indeed, a defeat in a presidential 
prim ary can be symptomatic of a candidate's fundam ental w eakness and harbinger of 
declining future political outcomes. Yet the post-prim ary political prospects of a failed 
presidential candidate are not nearly as dire as one m ight expect. While they did not 
earn their party 's nomination, a vast array of political possibilities rem ain that may not 
have been available had the candidate opted not to seek the presidential nom ination in
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the first place; opportunities ranging from low-level appointed positions in the 
government to the opportunity for seeking the presidential nom ination again and this 
time being successful.
T h e  P r e v i o u s l y - R u n  Figure51
Ar^ATVT' TAr’ c Post-Reform Republican PartyA D V A N T A G E  ^
Com petitive Primary Contest
T h e  R e p u b l i c a n  L i n e  o f  
S u c c e s s i o n
One of the m ost striking trends that
contradicts the notion that prim ary losers
YEAR NOMINEE RUNNER-UP
1976 Gerald Ford Ronald Reagan
1980 Konald Reagan George H.W. Bush
1988 George H.W. Bush Bob Dole
1996 Hob Dole Pat Buchanan
2000 George W. Bush John McCain
200S lohn McCain Mitt Rom ney
2(112 Mitt Rom ney Rick Santorum
is the Republican Party's "line of succession" 
for the presidential nomination. In the first post-reform Republican prim ary in 1976, 
Ronald Reagan mounted a robust challenge to sitting President Gerald Ford. Ford won 
a narrow  victory, securing only 52.5 percent of the prim ary vote before being defeated 
in the general election by Jimmy Carter.149 Four years later, in seeking a nominee to 
challenge then President Carter, the Republican party  chose Reagan, the natural heir 
apparent to the party 's presidential mantle. The Republicans w ould repeat the process 
of nom inating the arguable runner-up from the previous competitive prim ary in  every 
prim ary election since, with a lone exception in 2000 w hen they nom inated the son of 
their previous successful nominee, not exactly an unknow n commodity.
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While Reagan appeared to be a strong candidate and the natural heir in 1980, he 
faced a strong challenge from George H.W. Bush, w ho capitalized on the new  system in 
a very m odem  way, concentrating upon the early Iowa caucuses in an attem pt to gain 
m om entum  and the eventual nom ination.150 Bush captured Iow a and seven other 
contests, before w ithdraw ing from the presidential race and joining the Reagan ticket as 
his vice-presidential nominee. Reagan w on reelection in 1984, leaving Bush, the 
incum bent Vice-President and former runner-up as the natural heir to the 1988 
nomination. Yet Bush too was challenged by other figures, m ost notably by Senator Bob 
Dole, w ho captured the Iowa caucuses and w on nineteen percent of the vote before his 
w ithdrawal. Bush won the Republican nom ination and the general election in 1988 and 
as incum bent president unsuccessfully sought reelection as the Republican Party's 
nominee in 1992. In 1996, when seeking a nominee to challenge Democratic President 
Bill Clinton, the Republicans chose Bob Dole, the previous runner-up.
The 2000 election represents the only deviation from this m odel and even in this 
circumstance George W. Bush was far from a political outsider as the son of a former 
President. Finishing second to George W. Bush in 2000 was John McCain, w ho was 
nom inated after a protracted prim ary battle in 2008, besting the second placed 
challenger, Mitt Romney. From the outset of the 2012 Republican prim ary process, 
Romney was seen as the front-runner despite his flaws. After facing a long list of 
possible alternatives, he too w ent on to secure the 2012 Republican presidential
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nomination. In fact, the last Republican nominee w ho had no t already served as 
President, ran  for the presidency or was the son of a former President, was Barry 
Goldwater in 1964.
A  F a i l e d  C a n d i d a c y  a s  a n  A s s e t
The prevailing trend seems to dem onstrate a powerful incentive for a prospective
prim ary candidate to enter the race. It appears that Republicans like to nom inate
know n-quantity candidates, and perhaps the easiest w ay to introduce and substantiate
oneself is to pursue a campaign for the presidential nom ination. At least amongst
Republicans, a previous failed prim ary candidacy is not necessarily an encumbrance to
future forays into presidential politics bu t maybe an advantage and  perhaps a necessity.
This striking trend prom pts one to w onder w hy a failed candidacy for the 
presidential nom ination can be beneficial and a prerequisite for one party  at least. It can 
be partially attributed to benefits of perception; a viable prim ary cam paign entails 
m edia-generated exposure and raising of one's profile and prestige am ongst the public 
and party  elites. But crucially, there are m ore practical benefits that a candidate who had 
already sought their party 's presidential nom ination m ight enjoy should he or she run 
again.
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T h e  R e u s e  o f  E l e c t o r a l  I n f r a s t r u c t u r e
Among the possible mechanisms at w ork is that it is far easier to reconstruct
previous electoral infrastructure than it is to build it from scratch. Republican strategist 
Terry Nelson pu t it succinctly, "having run  before for president puts you in a better 
place to run again."151 National and state-level political operatives in prim ary races are 
in extremely high dem and almost imm ediately after the conclusion of the previous 
election. Once and future candidates likely have more personal connections and 
familiarity w ith these operatives and therefore likely have the upper-hand in securing 
their services. These operatives have a vested interest in w orking for the eventual 
nominee and possibly can see a previous candidate w ith w hom  they are familiar as a 
more plausible candidate for the nom ination and partner to w ork with.
Mitt Romney made extensive use of his previous unsuccessful presidential b id  in 
2008 w hen forming the electoral infrastructure for his 2012 run. He m aintained previous 
campaign staff as paid employees of his "Super PAC," allowing him  to rem ain in 
pseudo-cam paign mode throughout the gap betw een the 2008 general election and the 
beginning of the 2012 prim ary season.152 He also cultivated ongoing relationships 
amongst his former campaign staff, w ho m et periodically.153 In early prim ary voting 
states, especially New Hampshire, Romney retained the allegiance of m any key senior 
staffers who had worked for him in 2008.154 In effect, Romney had  "a turn-key political 
apparatus in place and ready for deploym ent should he decide to run  again."155 This is 
not to say that every previous candidate w ho seeks the presidency again will have such
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readily useable campaign infrastructure; Romney appears to have consciously exerted 
himself to m aintain his campaign organization. But it is an opportunity  for a hard ­
working candidate to give their future electoral prospects a considerable benefit.
F a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  t h e  K i n g m a k e r s
Another extremely im portant aspect of m odern presidential cam paigning is
raising money, both directly through contributions to one's cam paign or party, as well 
as through contributions to political organizations like "Super PACs." The m ost recent 
Republican presidential nom ination contest dem onstrated the increased pow er of 
outside political groups in the wake of the Citizens United decision. This new  political 
landscape has created the possibility that not merely a small m onied cadre of elites, but 
a single individual can exert great influence over a nom ination contest. A previously 
unsuccessful candidate is likely to have more personal contact w ith these wealthy elites 
and be more likely to maintain a relationship w ith  them  betw een their unsuccessful 
prim ary and the next nomination contest.
A former unsuccessful nominee m ight also enjoy the crucial advantage of being 
familiar and perhaps thereby more acceptable to party  elites. W hile the reforms of the 
prim ary system have decidedly shifted pow er away from party elites and to the party 
rank-and-file, elites still wield considerable pow er in determ ining the eventual
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nominee. Fundraising as discussed above, is an im portant factor. But perhaps the more 
im portant expression of elite support is in the form of endorsem ents.
These public endorsements are a valuable political resource because they act as a 
im portant cue for prim ary voters.156 Those attached to the party  typically support the 
candidate w ith more elite support than those w ithout it.157 They can also be useful if the 
endorser is someone in a position of pow er or authority whose endorsem ent entails a 
tangible benefit, such as a governor or the head of a political organization.158
D i m i n i s h i n g  R e t u r n s  f r o m  M u l t i p l e  C a n d i d a c i e s ?
This potential advantage suggests that a younger candidate considering
postponing their presidential run until a later electoral cycle m ight be better served 
making their presidential bid immediately. There is how ever the risk that in so doing, a 
candidate could be perceived as stale and face dim inishing returns in their future 
perhaps more plausible presidential run. Some evidence in the historical record 
indicates that candidates receive less electoral support their second or third time in  a 
primary. Of the eleven viable candidates w ho ran in m ultiple prim aries since 1976 and 
never were nominated, only three received a higher share of the popular prim ary vote 
on their second or third attempt.
But many of these are candidates w ho had no real chance of being nom inated in 
the first place. For some of them like Lyndon LaRouche, declining levels of actual
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electoral support is not as problematic as they w ould for a candidate w ith a more 
plausible chance at the nomination. As long as a more quixotic candidate can stay in the 
conversation of the primary, they have largely achieved their goals. A nd the electoral 
success of the five members of the Republican line of succession since 1976159 further 
seem to indicate a smaller chance of declining electoral support am ongst more plausible 
candidates in a second prim ary attempt.
T h e  P a r t i s a n  D i v i d e  F ig u re5.2
While all former viable prim ary Post-Reform Democratic Party
Com petitive Primary Contest
candidates can experience political benefit Results
Republican party. This disparity betw een the 2000 Al Gore
parties could be indicative of a fundamental .?9.98- Bafack.C)^ arn.a.
YEAR NOM INEE RUNNER-UP
1976 I immy Carter Jerry Brown
1984 Walter M ondale G ni\ Mart
1988 M ichael Dukakais Jesse Jackson
1992 Hill Clinton Jerry Brown
2000 Al Gore Bill Bradley
2004 John Kerry John Edwards
2008 Barack Obama Hillary Clinton
difference in the two party 's selection m ethods and it also seems to be congruent w ith 
the intuitive perception of the Republican party. The Republican party historically has 
tended to be grounded in the ideas of caution, familiarity and an orderly progression of 
events and has had the reputation of being rather safe w ith its selections. The "line of 
succession" model they have consciously or unconsciously followed fits rather well 
w ith this paradigm . This idea is bolstered by the fact that until recently, Republican
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primaries tended to be less competitive and feature fewer viable candidates; a less 
chaotic and perhaps more controlled system that w ould seem m ore amenable to a 
familiar, proven candidate. It is also possible that because of the nature of the party, 
endorsements indicating elite support carry more w eight in  Republican races.
By contrast, the Democratic Party has not exhibited such a clear pattern  in its 
nominations since the advent of the spectacle prim ary system. This too seems to fit the 
intuitive perception of the Democratic Party, which until recently had  the reputation of 
being a loose amalgamation of disparate interest groups w ho have a difficult time 
settling on a candidate. Since Democratic candidates logically should receive the same 
practical benefits as their Republican counterparts, it w ould seem that the partisan 
disparity in the future presidential electoral prospects of former failed candidates is due 
either to simple chance or fundam ental differences betw een the two parties in w hat 
they value in their candidates and how  they make their selections.
In stark contrast to Republicans, candidates who have previously sought and 
failed to secure the Democratic Party 's nom ination have largely no t been a major force 
in subsequent nom ination contests. The seven Democratic runners-up had  very little 
involvement in presidential electoral politics later in life apart from Jerry Brown, who 
finished second in 1976 and sought the nom ination again in 1992 only to finish second 
yet again to Bill Clinton. While six of the eight Republican nom inees since 1976 had
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previously sought their party 's nomination, only one of the seven Democratic nominees 
since 1976 have done so.
The one Democratic nominee w ho had already sought his party 's  nomination 
was Al Gore, who had  finished third in the 1988 as a young Senator from Tennessee and 
then served as Vice-President during the Clinton adm inistration. Gore's tenure as Vice- 
President certainly played a larger role in  his nom ination in 2000 than did  his former 
candidacy. In any event, Bill Clinton's selection of Gore as a running m ate in 1992 
demonstrates a less striking bu t still noticeable alternative trend unique to the 
Democratic Party of choosing former prim ary participants as vice-presidential 
nominees.
T h e  P r i m a r y  C a m p a i g n  a s  a  " S t e p p i n g  
S t o n e "
S e c o n d  P l a c e  M e a n s  S e c o n d  B i l l i n g ?
Some academic literature asserts that the "stepping-stone" thesis, seeking a
presidential nom ination as the m eans to the vice-presidential nomination, while
somewhat intuitive is historically incorrect.160 Contrary to the idea explicitly pu t forth
by Jesse Jackson after his second-place finish in the 1988 Democratic primaries, finishing
second does not necessarily entail second billing on a presidential ticket.161 In fact, in the
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rare instance that the vice-presidential nominee is draw n from the field of prim ary 
contenders, they are often a weaker rather than the stronger candidate.162
There is some truth to these claims, bu t only in a very narrow  sense. For the 
specific circumstance of Jesse Jackson in 1988, this appears to be an accurate assessment. 
But this does not disprove the "stepping-stone" thesis as a whole. While adm ittedly few 
presidential nominees select a prim ary opponent from the same electoral cycle, since 
that study 's publication, Jon Edw ards and Joe Biden w ere both selected after 
participating in that prim ary cycle. A nd even if the effect is not immediate, participation 
in a presidential prim ary can act a long-term  stepping stone to the vice-presidential 
nomination. Lloyd Bentsen and Jack Kemp epitomize this ability for former presidential 
candidates to reappear on a presidential ticket in later electoral cycles.
The other crucial point of this w ork dem onstrates that if a presidential nominee 
selects a former prim ary opponent, they typically select a weaker candidate rather than 
their main rival. While this does contradict the "second-place, second billing" idea, it 
actually strengthens the im petus for a self-interested candidate w ho is vacillating upon 
an entry into the prim ary field because they are no t confident in their ability to secure 
the nom ination or even finish second. The crucial elem ent to w arran t consideration as a 
running m ate is not necessarily a candidate's overwhelm ing success as a prim ary 
contender, bu t merely their participation in the process.
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T h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  F ig u re5.3
D E M O C R A T I C  V P  N o m i n e e s  Dem ocratic Party Presidential
In any event, it appears to be a Tickets Since 1976
phenom enon far more prevalent in the 
Democratic Party. Four of the seven Vice- 
Presidential nominees for the Democratic Party 
since 1976 have been candidates w ho had
YEAR N om in ee VP N om in ee
1976 j Jimmy Carter Walter M ondale
1980 ’jim m y Carter Walter M ondale
1984 ; Walter M ondale Geraldine Ferraro
1988 j Michael Dukakis Lloyd Bensten*
1992 1 Bill Clinton Al Gore*








2012 Barack Obama* __ _ J_____ _______ ____ Joe Biden*
* D enotes a previous unsuccessful primary 
lost. These four candidates, Joe Biden, Jon participant
Edwards, Al Gore and Lloyd Bentsen are also four of the last five Vice-Presidential 
nominees for the Democratic Party.
This pattern, much like the Republican line of succession, could be the result of 
simple chance; when dealing w ith such small num bers random  patterns can emerge 
w ithout significant underlying causes. But this phenom enon also suits an intuitive 
explanation given the character of the party. The Democrats have no line of succession, 
instead historically erring on the side of nom inating relatively less experienced 
candidates than the Republicans. One of the m ain objectives for a nom inee's vice 
presidential selection is to "balance the ticket," selecting a candidate w ith different 
geographic or ideological appeal or based on personal factors like age and experience. 
Thus it makes sense that Democrats, in nom inating less established Presidential 
candidates, seek to nominate more established Vice-Presidents. Former candidates for
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president represent a logical body to draw  upon for these kind of establishm ent figures. 
Perhaps the most instructive example of this phenom enon is the current Democratic 
executive tandem  of Barack Obama and Joe Biden. W hen he w as initially nominated, 
some within Obam a's campaign and the Democratic Party believed that despite being 
perceived as something of a dull choice, Joe Biden, w ho had  run  for President in 1988 
and then again in 2008, represented a solid choice that w ould assuage the concerns of 
working-class white Democrats and more traditionally centrist Dem ocrats.163 Biden was 
a quintessential "balancing" candidate w hom  even Obama him self reportedly was 
incredulous he had selected.164 But if Obama were simply looking for a establishment 
figure within the Democratic Party he had m any other options. Geographically, Biden 
had little to offer as his home state of Delaware has only three electoral votes and is 
already solidly Democratic. It seems likely that part of the reason for Biden's selection 
over other plausible vice-presidential candidates w ith more potential geographic 
advantages was his relative salience to the public and the party  since his unrem arkable 
campaign for President in 2008.
T h e  N e w c o m e r  R e p u b l i c a n  V P  N o m i n e e s
By contrast, the Republican Party tends to nom inate more establishm ent figures
for President and therefore has less need to choose a familiar candidate for vice-
president to reassure their base or party elites. Only two of their vice-presidential
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nominees out of seven, George H. W. Bush 
and Jack Kemp, had previously sought their 
party 's nomination. These patterns are 
salient to the outcomes of failed presidential 
candidates because they offer an alternative 
to the notion that electorally speaking, a 
failed candidate has few future prospects.
N o  R o o m  i n  t h e  C a b i n e t
While previously unsuccessful prim ary candidates still have opportunities to
contend for the presidential or the vice-presidential nom ination in the future, they
appear to have few prospects for em ploym ent low er in the executive branch. Of all the
unsuccessful prim ary contenders from 1976 to the present, only two have later been
appointed to a cabinet-level position. Lloyd Bentsen, w ho had unsuccessfully run  for
President and been nom inated for Vice-President in 1988, was appointed as the Clinton
adm inistration's first Treasury Secretary in  1993. Following their tense prim ary battle,
Barack Obama appointed Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State in 2008. Fellow 2008
candidate Bill Richardson was reportedly preliminarily chosen for the Commerce
Secretary post but w ithdrew  his candidacy due to an ongoing ethics investigation.165
But these examples are the exception rather than  the rule. Suffice to say, an aspiring
Figure 5.4
Republican Party Presidential Tickets 
Since 1976
YEAR PRES NOM INEE VP NOM INEE
1976 Gerald Ford Bob Dole
1980 Ronald Reagan George H.W. Bush*
1984 ’Ronald Reagan George H.W. Bush*
1988 ! George H. W. Bush  
1992 ’George H.W. Bush
Dan Quayle 
Dan Quayle
1996 Robert Dole 
2000 George W. Bush
Jack Kemp* 
Dick Cheney
2004 George W. Bush Dick Cheney
2008 John McCain Sarah Palin
2012 Mitt Romney Paul Ryan
* D enotes a previous unsuccessful primary 
participant
9 i
cabinet member likely has better avenues to their goal than challenging for the 
presidency against the eventual nominee.
There is scarcely more hope for unsuccessful presidential candidates further 
dow n the hierarchy of appointed executive positions. Walter M ondale and George 
McGovern found small niches w ithin governm ent as A m bassador to Japan and United 
States Ambassador to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture, 
respectively. H ow ard Baker eschewed the pure public service avenue and later became 
chief of staff for President Reagan.
Why is there such a dearth of presidential contenders, typically people in the 
upper echelon of national politics, in the executive branch? The reasons are somewhat 
unclear, bu t we can infer a few plausible answers. If a prim ary is particularly 
contentious or the two candidates are ideologically disparate, the eventual president 
may not w ant to follow President Lincoln's example and construct a "team  of rivals." It 
also seems possible that cabinet positions are by their very nature m ore technocratic and 
therefore less suitable for an appointee from the legislative branch w ith little executive 
experience in the related field.
For instance, Lloyd Bentsen was appointed as the Treasury Secretary, largely on 
the strength of his service as Chairm an of the Senate Finance Committee. His 
predecessor at Treasury, Nicholas Brady, had  also been a Senator. But none of the other 
eleven non-interim Treasury Secretaries to serve since 1976 have held any elected office
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whatsoever. They are not formerly elected public servants, bu t rather financial policy­
makers like Timothy Geithner or former CEOs of large corporations, especially financial 
institutions, like Robert Rubin and H ank Paulson.
The Secretary of State position tells a similar story. While Hillary Clinton was 
appointed by President Obama, her outcome was the exception rather than  the rule. Of 
the eleven other Secretaries of State since 1976, only Edm und M uskie had 
unsuccessfully sought his party presidential nom ination or indeed held elected office at 
aj] 166167 The Secretaries of State have typically spent m ost or all of their careers not in 
elected office bu t elsewhere in the public service, many in diplom atic positions or in 
other parts of the executive branch.
A part from the presidential and vice-presidential futures of some former 
presidential candidates, there appears to be little hope for these prim ary participants in 
the executive branch. This is not to say that m ost unsuccessful presidential candidates 
have no future in government. But that future tends not to be in the executive bu t rather 
in the legislative branch from whence they have come. M any former presidential 
candidates, especially earlier in the history of the spectacle primary, simply returned to 
their previous jobs, primarily in the Senate and H ouse of Representatives. While that 
may seem a paltry prize for a prim ary participant, as discussed above, this m ay help 
solidify their hold  over their elected office.
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Figure 5.5
Elected Official Presidential Candidates: W hen and H ow  They Leave 
Their Seats
Serving Legislators/ Primary, Last 
Governors/Mayors Year ' Year in
Office








Anderson, John B. 1980 1980 N o Gramm, Phil 1996 2002 N o
Baker, Howard 1980 1984
_
N o Harkin, Tom 1992 2014 N o
Bayh, Birch 1976 1980 Yes Hart, Gary
1984,
1988 1986 N o
Bentsen, Lloyd 1976 1992 N o Humphrey, Hubert 1976 1978 N o





1982 N o Jackson, Scoop 1976 1983 N o
Byrd, Robert 1976 2010 N o Kemp, Jack 1988 1988 N o
Church, Frank 1976 PJ80 Yes Kennedy, Edward 1480 2004 No
Clinton, Hillary 2008 2008 Ne Kerrey, Bob 1992 2000 N o
Crane, Phil 1980 2004 Yes Kucinich, Dennis
2004,
2008 2012 Yes"
Cranston, Alan 1984 1992 No Lieberman, Joe 2004 2012 N o
Dodd, Chris 2008 2010 N o Lugar, Richard 1996 2012 \es"
Dole Bob 1988 1496 N o McCain, John 2000 Current N o
Edwards, John
2004,
2008 2004 N o Paul, Ron
2008 2012 N o
Gephardt, Dick
1988,
2004 2004 N o Richardson, Bill 2008
2010 No'"
Glenn, John 1984 1998 N o Simon, Paul 1988 1996 N o
Gore, A1 1988 1992 N o Wallace, George 1976 1978 N o
Chart show s primary candidates w ho were elected officials w hen they ran for President, the year they 
unsuccessfully sought the presidency, their last year in their elected office, and w hether their departure 
was due to electoral defeat
S i t t i n g  C a n d i d a t e s  K e e p i n g  W h a t  T h e y  
H a v e
D o  V o t e r s  P u n i s h  C a n d i d a t e s  w i t h  N a t i o n a l  
A s p i r a t i o n s ?
One of the most straightforward potential risks a candidate w ho already holds 
elected office m ight consider is the prospect of losing their office w hilst pursing the
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presidential nomination. Intuitively, this could result from a candidate's distraction 
from the minutiae of their state or district in their attendance to the rigors of a national 
race. But it can also result from a tribalist m entality am ongst the electorate, believing a 
candidate seeking the presidential nom ination m ight be "too good" for the simple 
citizens of their district or state and is too fixated on their personal higher aspirations.
Michelle Bachmann seemingly illustrates this potential problem  rather well. 
Bachmann was first elected in 2006 and was reelected in 2008 and 2010 by an average of 
seven points.168 She launched a bid for the 2012 Republican nom ination, finding some 
initial success in the invisible primary. Yet her m om ent in the sun  was brief, and after 
disappointing results in the earlier prim aries, she w ithdrew  quite early in order to 
concentrate on her reelection to the House of Representatives.
After averaging a margin of victory of 7% over her previous three elections, 
Bachmann barely secured her reelection in 2012 by two points. While 2012 was a 
presidential cycle and a harsh year for Republicans in general, Bachmann could 
plausibly had hoped for a better result. She had secured reelection in 2008 by three
points w ith a lower public profile and accounting for only 58% of the total spending.169
/
In 2012, her public profile was far higher, largely by virtue of her failed presidential run 
and she had accounted for 84% of total spending, outspending her Democratic 
opponent by $9,666,848.170
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T h e  S a f e t y  o f  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e
At first glance, this harm ful effect seems broadly plausible and a potentially
significant problem for the self-interested presidential prim ary candidate. But there is
remarkably scant evidence of failed presidential candidates experiencing later electoral
difficulties. Of the thirty-five candidates to seek their party 's presidential nom ination
since 1976 who held elected office at the time, only five were later defeated in an
election. Democrats Birch Bayh and Frank Church both ran for president in 1976 and
lost their Senate reelection bids in 1980, a Republican wave year in which many
Democratic incumbents were defeated. Republican Phil Crane w as defeated in his bid
for reelection to the House of Representatives, bu t only narrow ly and in 2004, twenty-
four years after his presidential nom ination bid. The other two, Dennis Kucinich and
Richard Lugar, were defeated in prim ary elections by their ow n party 's  voters in 2012.171
It w ould seem to strain causation to blam e the losses of these last three on their failed
presidential candidacies.
While a handful of candidates have lost and others have been reelected by 
smaller than typical margins, m any viable prim ary candidates, and indeed m any 
legislators in general, occupy quite safe elected seats. Even if a candidate experienced a 
modest decline in electoral support, the effect w ould more likely be winning reelection 
by fifteen instead by twenty points rather than losing w hen they otherwise w ould have 
won. Apart from the five candidates m entioned above, the other thirty candidates only 
left the elected office they occupied w hen they ran for the presidential nom ination once
they had decided to retire or seek another office(see chart).172 There m ay be an element 
of selection bias; politicians who seek the presidency seem likely to be in a stronger 
political position than their colleagues as a whole. But it is also emblematic of the 
profound pow er of incumbency in the Senate and House of Representatives. In the two 
most recent Senate election cycles, only five elections featured an incum bent who 
sought reelection and failed.173
The more typical example of the political course of former presidential 
candidates is epitomized not by Birch Bayh and Frank Church bu t another pair of 
Democratic senators, Robert Byrd and Ted Kennedy. These two contem poraries sought 
the Democratic Party 's nom ination for president in 1976 and 1980 respectively. While 
they were unsuccessful, the pair were reelected to their positions in the US Senate a 
combined ten times after their presidential bids and emerged as leaders of their party 
while serving until their deaths in 2010 and 2009 respectively.
The fear of losing one's position m ay seem m ost acute w hen a candidate is up for 
reelection contemporaneously w ith their Presidential nom ination bid; all House 
members, a third of Senators and an indeterm inate am ount of Governors seeking the 
presidency w ould face this prospect. Yet m ost states do not force candidates to choose 
between seeking reelection to their low er office and seeking the presidency. There is 
some danger in seeking two offices sim ultaneously; the rigors of the presidential 
nomination campaign might cannibalize tim e and resources from the lower office
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campaign and create disaffection in the voters of a candidate's state or district. But for 
the majority of candidates whose reelection is virtually assured, seeking their party 's 
nomination even while simultaneously defending their current positions is a 
surprisingly low-risk proposition. Someone like Ron Paul, a H ouse m em ber from a 
relatively safe Republican district in Texas, likely faces minimal risk of reelection defeat 
w hether they seek the presidency or not. For other candidates facing more contentious 
elections, the risk will likely be greater. But overall, the idea that one will seriously 
endanger their current office by seeking the presidency seems overblown. It may make 
logical sense, bu t it does not seem to bear itself out in the historical record.
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Chapter VI - Conclusion
The fundam ental contention of this thesis is that that the conventional prim ary 
calculation vastly over-estimates the costs and risks associated w ith a prim ary 
campaign. Simultaneously, it focuses too narrow ly on actually securing the nom ination 
and under-appreciates the value of ulterior benefits available to all viable participants. 
These benefits are m ade possible by the advent and evolution of the spectacle prim ary 
system, a mechanism for the selection of presidential nom inees whose length and 
intensity offers innumerable opportunities for a participant to augm ent their public 
profile and garner valuable experience. The leviathan political m edia instills this process 
with importance and voraciously covers the process, allowing candidates to reach 
innumerable people they otherwise w ould not.
The confluence of these two factors has created an environm ent rife w ith 
practical and perception benefits, affording participants the opportunity  to bolster their 
public image and gain valuable experience and connections for the future. A candidate 
can pursue non-political aims, angling to gain a position in the growing pseudo­
political sector: as a pundit on television, in a lobbying firm or on the lecture circuit. 
They can try to maximize their exposure before leaving office to pursue em ploym ent in 
the private sector or use the presidential b id  to m aintain their relevancy while not in 
political office. Or a candidate can pursue further political benefits, laying the
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groundw ork for a more plausible presidential bid in the future o r angling for selection 
as running mate or in the possible cabinet of the nominee. In sh o rt the benefits one can 
possibly derive from participation in the prim ary process are quite diverse. A prim ary 
functions as a stage and a forum for participants to attem pt to advance their subsequent 
careers.
T h e  C h a n c e s  o f  R e f o r m
T h e  P a r a l l e l  P r i m a r i e s
The current prim ary system features tw o sim ultaneous bu t not necessarily
m utually exclusive contests in each cycle: the nom inative prim ary and the spectacle 
primary. The former fulfills the original purpose of a presidential prim ary; an intra­
party contest between candidates to decide upon  the optim al nominee. The other 
features its prim ary participants locked in competition for attention, experience or 
positive reception. These candidates are not so concerned w ith electoral results and 
instead are interested in using the process itself to maximize their ow n self-interest for 
other future endeavors.
The problem is that these two contests w ith very different goals m ust coexist 
w ithin the same structure. Candidates who are m ainly interested in self- 
aggrandizem ent are not restrained in their statem ents or policy positions by the need to 
appeal to a w ider electorate in the general presidential election. This is advantageous
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because they can make outrageous or overly simplistic statem ents that w ould not 
w ithstand intense scrutiny bu t are far m ore likely to generate exposure and attention 
than more nuanced positions held by candidates intent upon  actually governing in the 
future. More simplistic and ideologically extreme statements and policy positions tend 
to be more viscerally appealing to prim ary voters, who in both parties tend to be more 
ideologically extreme than party m em bers at large. For instance, H erm an Cain 
promoted his extremely simple tax reform proposal to create nine percent individual 
income, business income and national sales taxes by simply saying "nine, nine, nine" at 
seemingly every opportunity. All of the candidates race one another to the ideological 
extremes, compelling potential governing candidates to shift their ow n policy positions 
to compete. This phenom enon can been seen in M itt Romney's transition from a former 
governor to a presidential candidate; he was compelled to shift his positions to the right 
on abortion, the environment, and im m igration while im ploring the conservative 
Republican base to see him as a "severely conservative" governor.
S a t u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  S p e c t a c l e  P r i m a r y
The spectacle prim ary has grow n to such a trem endous extent that we are
approaching a saturation point. The invisible primary, the period of competition before
any actual prim ary voting, is unlikely to grow  any longer because it already essentially
begins im m ediately following the conclusion of the previous presidential election.
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Media outlets could feasibly start scheduling debates or other forms of campaign 
coverage even earlier than they already do, but given its extreme length already and 
some of the frustration voiced by party leaders following the grueling 2012 Republican 
primary, this seems unlikely.
R e f o r m  S t y m i e d  b y  A  S e l f - I n t e r e s t e d  R a c e  t o  t h e  
B o t t o m
However, it seems equally unlikely that the spectacle prim ary will contract in 
length or intensity in the foreseeable future. Things are unlikely to change because 
basically all of the major players involved in  the creation of the spectacle prim ary 
benefit too much from its existence. The inability to reform or reduce the process is 
symptom atic of a "race to the bottom " or a kind of arms race, am ongst all the self- 
interested players. Serious candidates seeking the nom ination w ho are unwilling to 
begin the "invisible primary" as soon as possible will find that their competitors have 
already secured valuable electoral assets while they dallied. M edia outlets are similarly 
compelled to maximize their coverage of the process; if they decide not to organize a 
debate because it is too early in the process or do not w ish to sign a past or future 
presidential candidate as yet another contributor, one of their competitors likely will.
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U n l i k e l y  P a r t y  I n t e r v e n t i o n
In this kind of environment dom inated by self-interest and lacking many
structural rules, organic reform of the system is extremely unlikely. The only feasible
way for the prim ary process to be shortened or refocused on its nom inative purpose is
the whole-scale imposition of control by the political parties. However, this too is
unlikely because traditionally, m uch of the prim ary process is decentralized and lacks
comprehensive top-dow n organization. In recent decades, parties have asserted more
control over the process, bu t it seems im probable that the parties w ould assert the
pow er necessary to fundamentally change the prim ary process. Parties too are trapped
by the arms race nature of elections. Ideally, a long and well-covered prim ary process
w ould be helpful to the party 's eventual nominee by maxim izing their exposure and
dem onstrating their aptitude for the presidency to the public. Should one party  decide
to truncate the process they may find that the other has gained the upper hand.
T h e  F u t u r e  o f  t h e  S p e c t a c l e  P r i m a r y
A n  U n e a s y  C o e x i s t e n c e ?
Fundam ental reform of the process in the near future is quite unlikely. But one
w onders w hether the spectacle and nom inative aspects of the prim ary process can
coexist. It appears that while the spectacle is a troubling im pedim ent, it does not pose
an existential threat to the whole enterprise. There does not appear to be any evidence
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that the sideshow of the prim ary process at the m om ent is injurious to the ultim ate 
selection of nominees or the effectiveness of the eventual President in governing. The 
2012 and 2008 Republican contests featured a good deal of not entirely serious 
candidates w ho received copious attention and were considered major candidates for 
the nomination, and yet those contests nom inated two candidates, M itt Romney and 
John McCain, who while unsuccessful in the general election, were still perhaps the best 
choices in a general election in large bu t unim pressive fields. Even during the last 
Democratic prim ary cycle, candidates like Joe Biden, Chris D odd and Mike Gravel 
benefitted from their participation in the process w ithout seemingly affecting the more 
serious contest between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton for the nomination. So 
perhaps the spectacle is a hinderance and an impediment, b u t does not pose an 
existential threat to the whole enterprise.
This is perhaps partly attributable to the enduring pow er of the parties and 
partisan elites in the nominative process of both parties. The Republican Party has been 
able to shepherd through a line of succession of know n quantities who are broadly 
acceptable and well-known by the party  hierarchy. Democrats for that m atter have a 
much more overt demonstration of elite-power w ith "superdelegates," party officials 
invested w ith votes at the convention purely at their ow n discretion and not bound by 
any popular contest.174
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S p e c u l a t i v e  C o u r s e s  f o r  t h e  2 0 1 2  P a r t i c i p a n t s
With these prevailing trends in prim ary politics, we can m ake some inferences
about the personal outcomes for the m ost recent crop of presidential prim ary also-rans,
the participants in the 2012 Republican primary. Applying the same selection criteria as
above, we find six "viable" unsuccessful prim ary candidates: Rick Santorum, Newt
Gingrich, Ron Paul, Jon Huntsman, Michelle Bachmann and Rick Perry.
An ever-increasing am ount of candidates over time have sought em ploym ent
following their failed presidential bid in the private sector. Heretofore, the 2012
participants appears to be continuing this trend, as only Bachmann and Perry now  serve
in government. Early evidence also seems to dem onstrate that having run  for President
before and failed is not necessarily a liability, bu t perhaps an asset. H untsm an and
Perry, two candidates who found very little success in 2012, are in  early 2013 pondering
runs at the nomination in 2016.
T h e  2 0 1 6  P r i m a r y
The "Republican line of succession" w ould lead us to believe that Rick Santorum
will be the Republican presidential nominee in 2016. Yet Santorum  does not fit well into 
that line of succession because he was an insurgent candidate from  the more staunchly 
conservative w ing of the Republican party. While Santorum  has been able to garner the 
support of similarly conservative activists, his ideological m akeup w ould likely make 
him less attractive to Republican Party elites as a heir apparent to the nom ination than
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his relatively more m oderate predecessor runners-up for the nom ination. However, 
prevailing trends heretofore are by no m eans Gospel, and Santorum  could inaugurate a 
new era of more ideologically extreme candidates being the prelim inary frontrunners in 
Republican primaries.
Media appetite for coverage of the 2016 prim ary season will likely be quite 
voracious, especially because it will feature likely competitive prim aries in both parties, 
thereby increasing the am ount of candidates, primaries, debates and story-lines to 
cover. Given this high level of attention, the low risk associated w ith  participation, and 
the lack of a clear frontrunner we can reasonably assume will ru n  in either party, it 
seems quite plausible that the 2016 prim aries will feature a plethora of candidates. Some 
will earnestly seek the nom ination and believe they have the legitimate chance to attain 
it. But others will likely be there in pursuit of ulterior objectives.
T h e  R i s k / R e w a r d  o f  P r i m a r y  
P a r t i c i p a t i o n
T h e  L o w  C o s t  a n d  A l m o s t  N o n - E x i s t e n t  R i s k  o f  
P r i m a r y  P a r t i c i p a t i o n
Participation in the spectacle prim ary system certainly entails costs. A candidate
could suffer under the weight of a punishing schedule and the scrutiny of the press or
spend too lavishly and find themselves m ired in personal debt. They could sacrifice
their previous job or miss other attractive em ploym ent while running. But these are
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estimable and somewhat avoidable costs, likely worthw hile inconveniences given the 
level of potential rewards. And while there are costs, the risks of pursuing a prim ary 
campaign appear to be shockingly low, especially for candidates not seriously pursuing 
the nomination.
If a candidate is only participating for the ulterior benefits, they are not overly 
concerned w ith electoral outcomes, bu t rather simply rem aining a viable participant. 
Therefore they are not compelled to w ork or spend on a comparable level to more 
serious candidates. A sitting elected official faces very little risk of losing their seat. 
Therefore, sitting elected officials have little to w orry about strategically.
One m ight think the worst case scenario w ould be a politician running for 
President and makes a fool of themselves. A nd indeed a spectacularly poor 
performance on such a big stage could be dam aging to the personal prospects of a 
candidate or reveal some underlying weakness as a candidate. But even for those whose 
candidacies have been considered profound disappointm ents, their post-prim ary 
outcomes are not as dire as one m ight assume. Rick Perry w as w idely ridiculed for his 
lack of preparation and debate gaffes and yet he is still considered a viable potential 
candidate for the 2016 Republican primary. Wesley Clark, a highly coveted political 
neophyte just four years earlier, w as "persona non grata at the 2008 Democratic 
National Convention."175 Yet as discussed above, Clark's life has been far from a
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disaster since his failure in presidential politics; he enjoys enviable positions in multiple 
private companies and recently hosted his ow n television show.
T h e  U n d e r - A p p r e c i a t e d  R i s k  o f  A n o n y m i t y
While it is intuitive for people to calculate the potential risk and rewards of
deciding to do something, it is more difficult to contemplate the potential consequences
of choosing not to do something. Prospective candidates w ould be wise to consider
their personal outcomes should they decide not to seek the presidency. It is possible that
for the self-interested candidate, anonym ity could be worse than ignominy. Political
figures, especially former ones who w ish to rem ain in the public spotlight and m aintain
their profile, have no other comparable opportunity to the spectacle process for self-
aggrandizement. For a self-interested politician, m aintaining relevancy is vital, whether
they choose to stay in government or go into the private sector. Essentially, the prim ary
process offers, significant opportunities for reward, while abstention from the spectacle
carries w ith it a hidden risk of irrelevancy and disappearance from the public mind.
W h y  N o t  R u n ?
The prim ary process fundam entally changed w ith introduction of meaningful
comprehensive reform in the 1970s. Further structural and norm ative changes over time
have created an environment offering a bevy of benefits and alm ost no risk whatsoever.
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For candidates with a legitimately plausible path  to the nom ination, these benefits are 
available even if they fail to reach that goal. And for m ore quixotic candidates, 
especially for those w ith little to lose, the opportunity to partake in such an 
unparalleled opportunity for exposure and attention should clearly not be squandered. 
Therefore those whose candidacies are decidedly im probable and are w idely ridiculed 
are not necessarily making poor personal decisions, but rather are rational actors, 
maximizing their self-interest. Given the personal outcomes of unsuccessful prim ary 
participants and the observation of prevailing trends, it seems that the real question 
prospective candidates should ask themselves is not "w hy run?" bu t "w hy not run?"
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1985 - 2002 Member, US Senate
1979 -1985 Member, US H ouse o f Representatives
1971 -1978 Partner, Gramm & Associates
1973 -1978 Professor, Tex. A&M U.




1989 Founder, President, The Democracy Found. "Mike Gravel."
The Complete
M arquis W h o ’s
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1969 -1981 Member, US Senate
1965 -1966 Speaker, Alaska H ouse of Representatives
1962 -1966 Member, Alaska H ouse of Representatives
Harkin, Tom 
1992
2009- Chairman, US Senate Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions ( "Tom Harkin."
The Complete
M arquis W ho 's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




2007 - 2009 Chairman, US Senate Agricultural, Nutrition, & Forestry Cor
2001 - 2003 Chairman, US Senate Agricultural, Nutrition, & Forestry Cor
2001 Chairman, US Senate Agricultural, Nutrition, & Forestry Cor
1985- Member, US Senate
1975 -1985 Member, US H ouse of Representatives
1973 -1974 Attorney, Polk County Legal A id Society
1970 Staff Member, US H ouse Select Com m ittee on US Involvem e
Harris, Fred 
1976
1976- Professor of Political Science, U. N.M ex. "Fred Harris." 
The Complete 
M arquis W ho 's
X A T I .  . / r> \
1964 - 73 Member, US Senate




Running for YEAR OCCUPATION Source
President




4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




2009- Scholar in Residence, Wirth Chair Professor, U. Colo. Sch. Pu
"Gary Hart." 
The Complete 
M arquis W ho 's  
W h o (R )
2009- Vice-Chairman, H om eland Security A dvisory Council, US D
1988- of counsel, Strategic and Legal A dvisor on International Law
1985 of counsel, Davis, Graham & Stubbs
Hart, Gary 1976 - 84 Member, US Senate Biographies.
1984 1970 - 72 National Campaign Director, George McGovern Presidential Accessed
1967 - 70, 
1972 -1974
Private Attorney 4 /16 /2 0 1 3 . 
ww w . lexis nexis. c 
om /hottopics/ 
lnacademic.1967 Special Assistant to Secretary of the Interior
1964 -1965 Attorney, US Departm ent of Justice
2012- Host, Syndicated Radio Program, Cum ulus M edia Network, "Mike
2009- Host, Cum ulus Media N etw ork, The Huckabee Report Huckabee." The
2008- Host, Huckabee, Fox N ew s Channel Complete
2008- Political commentator, Fox N ew s Channel M arquis W h o ’s
Huckabee, 1996 - 2007 Governor, State of Arkansas
W h o (R )
Biographies.
Accessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .
/  Mike 1993 -1996 Lt. Governor, State of Ark., Little Rock
2008 1992 - 1996 President, Cambridge Comm., Texarkana, Ark.
1987 -1992 President, KBSC-TV w w w .lexisnexis
1986 - 1996 Pastor, Beech St. 1st Bapt. Ch., Texarkana, Ark. .com /
1980 -1985 Pastor, Immanuel Bapt. Ch., Pine Bluff, Ark. hottop ics/
1974 -1975 Pastor, Walnut St. Bapt. Ch., Arkadelphia lnacademic.
vis. Professor, M acalester College, St. Paul "Vice President
1971 -1978 Member, US Senate Hubert Horatio
1969 -1971 Professor University o f M innesota Humphrey." 
LB] Library. 
A ccessed  
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .
1969 -1971 Professor, Macalester College
Humphrey,
Hubert
1968 Democratic Presidential N om inee
1965 -1969 Vice President of the U nited States www.lbjlib.utex
1976 1949 -1964 Member, US Senate as.ed u /














2003 - 2007 Chairman Armed Services Committee, US H ouse "Hunter,
Duncan." The
Complete
M arquis W h o ’s
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .









1997-2000 Special Envoy of the President & Secretary of State for the Pr "Jesse Jackson."
The Complete
M arquis W ho 's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1997- Founder, The Wall St. Project
1991 -1996 Shadow Senator, US Senate
1984- Founder, President, R ain b ow /P u sh  Coalition, Inc.
1984 Founder, Citizenship Education Fund
1977-1996 Founder, PUSH-Excel and PUSH for Economic Justice
1971 -1996 Founder, Executive Director, Operation PUSH (People Unite<
1967-1971 National Director, Operation Breadbasket Project, Southern C
1966 -1967 Chicago Director, O peration Breadbasket Project, Southern C










D irectory o f the 
U nited States 
Congress. 
A ccessed  
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 . 
h ttp : //
bioguide, congre 
ss .g o v /scr ip ts/ 
biodisplay.pl? 
index=j000013
1946 President, International Maritime Conference
1941 -1952 Member, US H ouse o f Representatives
1953 -1983 Member, US Senate
1960 Chairman, Democratic N ational Com m ittee
Kemp, Jack 
1988




P1 nnvnvt b 1 rn 1
1989 -1993 United States Secretary of H ousing and Urban D evelopm ent
1971 -1989 Member, US H ouse o f Representatives






■■' YEAR OCCUPATION Source




4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .
h ttp : //
bioguide.congre
ss .g o v /scr ip ts/
biodisplay.pl?
index=K000086




1962 - 2009 
1961 -1962
Member, US Senate







4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1951 -1953 US Army
Kerrey, Bob 
1992
2001 - 2010 President, The N ew  School "Bob Kerrey."
The Complete
M arquis W ho's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
Accessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1995 -1999 Chairman, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Com m ittee (DS<
1989 - 2001 Member, US Senate
1987-1989 Partner, Printon, Kane & Co.
1983 -1987 Governor, State of Nebraska
1972 -1975 Owner, Founder, Prairie Life Center




2004 Candidate for US Senate
"Alan Keyes."
The Complete
M arquis W h o ’s
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .
2002
1996
Host, Alan Keyes: M aking Sense 
Founder & President, The Declaration Found
1994 - 2000 National Talk Radio Show  Host, The Alan Keyes Show: Am e
1992 Candidate for US Senate
1991 -1992 Syndicated Colum nist, Scripps Howard
1991 Interim President, Ala. A&M U.
1989 -1992 President, Citizens Against Government Waste
1988
1987 -1989
Candidate for US Senate




R unning for 
President
YEAR OCCUPATION Source
1985 -1988. Assistant Secretary of state for International Organizations w w w . lexi snexis 
.com / 
h ottop ics/ 
lnacademic.
1985 -1988  
1983 -1985
Assistant Secretary for International Organizational Affairs, 1
US Representative to U nited N ations Economic and Social C
1981 -1983  
1980 -1981
Policy Planning Staff, US Departm ent of State 
D esk Officer, US State Department, Zimbabwe
1979 -1980  
1978
Consular Officer, US State Departm ent 
Foreign Service Officer, US State Departm ent
Kucinich, 
D ennis  
2004, 2008
1997- Member, US H ouse of Representatives "Dennis
Kucinich." The
Complete




4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1995 -1997 Member, Ohio State Senate
1985 -1995  
1981 -1982
President, K Comm.
Councilman, Cleveland City Council
1977-1979 Mayor, City of C leveland
1976 -1977 Clerk of Courts, Cleveland M unicipal Court
1970-1975 Councilman, C leveland C ity  Council




2004- Founder, Lyndon LaRouche Political Action Com m ittee "Lyndon
LaRouche." The
Complete
M arquis W ho s
W h o (R )
Biographies.
Accessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1990 Candidate for US H ouse of Representatives
1980 -1983 Chairman, A dvisory Committee, National Democratic Policy
1981 -1987 Member, Board of Directors., Fusion Energy Found
1975 -1987 Co-founder, Fusion Energy Found
1974- Founder, Contributing Editor, Executive Intelligence Review
1952 -1972 Management Consultant




2007 - 2013 Chairman, US Senate H om eland Security & Governmental, t "Joseph
Lieberman."
The Complete .
M arquis W ho's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
Accessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




2001 - 2003 Chairman, US Senate G overnm ental Affairs Com m ittee
2001 Chairman, US Senate Governmental Affairs Com m ittee
1995 - 2001 Chairman, Democratic Leadership Council
1989 - 2013 Member, US Senate
1983 -1989 Attorney General, State of Connecticut
1975 - 1981 Majority Leader, Connecticut State Senate
1972 -1983 Partner, Lieberman, Segaloff & W olfson
1971 -1981 Member, Connecticut State Senate
1968 co-Chairman, Senator Robert F. K ennedy Presidential Campj










2013- Disting. Professor, U. Indpls. "Richard
Lugar." The
Complete
M arquis W ho s
W h o (R )
Biographies.
Accessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




2013- vis. Disting. Professor of Public Policy, G eorgetown U. Public
1983 -1984 Chairman, National Republican Senatorial Com m ittee
1995 - 2001 Chairman, US Senate Agricultural Nutrition & Forestry Com
2003 - 2006 Chairman, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee
1985 -1986 Chairman, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Member, US Senate1977 - 2013
1976 vis. Professor of Political Science, U. Indpls.




2009- Member, US Senate Indian Affairs Committee
"John McCain."
The Complete




4 /16 /2 0 1 3 .




2009- Member, US Senate H om eland Security & G overnm ental A ff
2009- Member, US Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Co
2009- Member, US Senate Energy & National Resources Committee
2009- Ranking Member, US Senate Arm ed Services C om m ittee
2008 Republican Presidential N om inee
2005 - 2007 Chairman, US Senate Indian Affairs Committee
2003 - 2005 Chairman, US Senate Commerce Science & Transportation C
1997 - 2001 Chairman, US Senate Commerce Science & Transportation C
1995 -1997 Chairman, US Senate Indian Affairs Com m ittee
1987- Member, US Senate
1983 -1986 Member, US H ouse of Representatives










Candidate, D ies 
at 84." The N ew  
York Times. 
March 29, 2011. 
http:/ /
ww w .nytim es.c
o m /














Founder, Americans for Com m on Sense McGovern." A P
Candidate Bios.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1976 US Delegate to U nited N ations General A ssem bly
1963 - 81 Member, US Senate





D irectory o f the 
U nited States 
Congress. 
A ccessed  
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 . 
http:/ /
bioguide.congre 
s s .g o v /scripts/ 
biodisplay.pl? 
index=m000452
1957 -1961 Member, U.S. H ouse
Professor, N orthwestern University
Professor, Dakota W esleyan University
US Air Force
■ > .
Paul, Ron  
2008
1997 - 2013 Member, US H ouse of Representatives "Ron Paul." The
Complete
M arquis W ho 's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1988 Libertarian candidate for President
1979 -1985 Member, US H ouse of Representatives
1976 -1977 Member, US H ouse of Representatives
1968 Private Practice Physician
1965 -1968 OB-GYN Trainer, U. Pitts.








4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1967 -1975 Governor o f the State o f  California
1942 -1946  
1932 -1937
Army Air Corps 
GE Representative
1932 -1937 play-by-play announcer of University of Iowa football games



















4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .






Special Envoy for H em ispheric Affairs, Organization of Ame 
Chairman, Democratic Governors Association
2004 Chairman, Democratic National C onvention (DNC)
2003 - 2011 Governor, State of N ew  Mexico
2001 - 2002 
1998 - 2001
sr. mng. Director, Kissinger McLarty 
US Secretary of Energy
1997 - 98 Permanent US Representative to U nited N ations
1993 -1994 Chairman, US H ouse Natural Resources Subcom m ittee on N
1983 -1997 Member, US H ouse of Representatives
1983 -1985 Chairman, Congressional H ispanic Caucus
1978 Executive Director, Bernalillo County Democratic Committee
1978 Executive Director, N ew  M exico State Democratic Committee
1975 - 78 Staff Member, US Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee
1973 - 75 Staff Member, US State Department




1995- Chairman, Porchlight Entertainment, Inc. “Pat
Robertson." The
Complete
M arquis W ho's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1995- Chairman, Starguide Digital Networks, Inc.
1993- Founder, Chairman, Asia Pacific M edia Corp.
1990 - 97 Founder, Chairman, Intemat. Family Entertainment, Inc.
1990- Founder, President, Chairman, The American Center for Law
1989- Founder, President, The Christian Coalition
1982 Member, Board of Directors, United Virginia Bank
1978- Founder, Chairman, Operation Blessing International R elief;
1977- Founder, Chancellor, President, Regent U. (formerly CBN U.'
1968- Host, the 700 Club




2003 - 2007 Governor, Com m onw ealth of M assachusetts
"Mitt Romney."
The Complete
M arquis W ho's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .
w w w .lexisnexis
.com /
hottop ics/
In /■! rtrV N  1 n
1999 - 2002 President, CEO, Salt Lake Organizing Com m ittee (Winter 
Olympics)
1994 Candidate for US Senate
1992 - 2002, 
2009 - 2011, 
2012-
Member, Board of Directors, Marriott International, Inc.
1991 - 2001 Chairman, CEO, Bain & Co., Inc., Boston
1986 - 2001 Member, Board of Directors, Staples Inc.
1984 - 2001 mng. Partner, CEO, Bain Capital, LLC







1977 -1978 Consultant, Bain & Co., Inc.






M arquis W ho's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
Accessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




2006- Host, Daily National Talk Radio Program, Keepin It Real 
w ith A1 Sharpton
1997 Candidate, M ayor of N ew  York City
1994 -1998 Director Ministers D ivision, N ational Rainbow Push  
Coalition
1994 Candidate, US Senate
1992 Candidate, US Senate
1991 - Founder, President, CEO, N ational A ction Network, Inc.
1988 Candidate, US Senate
1978 Candidate, NY State Senate
1973 -1980 Road Manager, James Brown Concert Tours
1971 Founder, National Youth M ovem ent











4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .








Vice-Presidential N om inee
Chairman, Congressional Leadership for the Future (CLF)
1968 -1970 US Ambassador to France
1964 -1968 Director, Office of Econom ic Opportunity
1961 -1966 Director, Peace Corps
Director, Catholic Interracial Council











4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .
h ttp : //
1985 -1997 Member US Senate
1975 -1985 Member US H ouse of Representatives
1973 Professor Sangamon State University
1973 Professor Harvard University
1969 -1973 Lt. Governor, State of Illinois
1955 -1969 Member, Illinois H ouse of Representatives
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1991 -1994 Attorney, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn The Complete
M arquis W ho's
W h o (R )
Biographies.
A ccessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1982 spl. Counsel, US Senate Intelligence Committee
1980 -1981  
1980
spl. Counsel, US Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee  
spl. Counsel to Governor, State of Tennessee
1975 -1994 Private Attorney
1973 -1974 Minority Counsel, Watergate Com m ission




1979 -1985 Member, US Senate "Paul Tsongas." 
A P  Candidate 
Bios. A ccessed  
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 . 




1975 -1979 Member, US H ouse of Representatives
1973 -1975 M iddlesex County Com m issioner
1969 -1971 Assistant State Attorney General




1961 -1991 Member, US H ouse of Representatives "Mo Udall." A P
Candidate Bios.
Accessed
4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1952 -1954 Pima County Attorney
1948 -1949 Professional Basketball Player








4 /1 6 /2 0 1 3 .




1971 -1979 Governor, State of Alabama
1968 Presidential Candidate, American Independent Party
1962 -1967 Governor, State of Alabama
1958
1953 -1959
Candidate for Governor of Alabama 
District Court Judge
1946 -1947 Assistant State Attorney General
Army Air Corps
143
Appendix B: Published Works by 2008 Candidates
! Candidate Year Party Book Year
; Edwards, John j  2004,2008 Democrat ii
; Kucinich, D ennis | 2004,2008 Democrat The Courage to Survive j 2007
j A Prayer for America 2003
Biden, Joe [  2008 Democrat Promises to Keep: On Life and Politics 2008
i Clinton, Hillary f" 2008 Democrat Living History 2004
It Takes a Village 1996
Dodd, Chris 1 2008 Democrat
1 Gravel, Mike 2008 Democrat Citizen Power: A M andate for Change 2008
| Richardson, Bill 2008 Democrat Valleys of Death: A  Memoir of the Korean War 2010
Between Worlds: The M aking of an Am erican Life 2007
Bachelor Brothers' Bed & Breakfast P illow  Book 1998
! Bachelor Brothers' Bed & Breakfast 1997
I Bachelor Brothers' Bedside Com panion 1996
Q ueen of A ll the Dustballs: A nd Other Epics of 1992
Everyday Life
Keyes, Alan 1996,2000, Republican Our Character, Our Future 1996
2008 Masters of the Dream 1996
Giuliani, Rudy 2008 Republican Leadership 2005
Huckabee, Mike 2008 Republican Dear Chandler, Dear Scarlett: A  Grandfather's 
Thoughts on Faith, Family, and the Things That 
Matter M ost
2012
A  Sim ple Christmas: Twelve Stories That
2012
Celebrate the True H oliday Spirit
I:':"' '"k; F-- Can't Wait Till Christmas 2010
A  Sim ple Government: Twelve Things We Really 
N eed from Washington (and a Trillion That We 2011
Don't!)
I Character Makes a Difference: W here I'm From,
2007
Where I've Been and What I Believe
j ■ ......  ... D o the Right Thing: Inside the M ovem ent That's
2009
Bringing Com m on Sense Back to America
Living Beyond Your Lifetime: H ow  to Be 
Intentional about the Legacy You Leave 2000
From H ope to H igher Ground: 12 STEPS to 
Restoring America's Greatness
2007
Kids W ho Kill 1998
Hunter, Duncan 2008 Republican Victory in Iraq 2010
Paul, Ron 2008 Republican The Revolution: A  M anifesto 2009
End the Fed 2009
Liberty Defined: 50 Essential Issues That Affect 2012:
Our Freedom |
144
Candidate Year Party Book Year
Romney, Mitt
Thompson, Fred
The Case for Gold 2012
A Foreign Policy of Freedom: Peace, Commerce 2012
and H onest Friendship
Pillars of Prosperity: Free Markets, H onest 2008
Money, Private Property
Freedom Under Siege 2007
i M ises and Austrian Economics: A  Peronsal View 2008
2008 Republican N o  Apology: The Case for Am erican Greatness j 2010
Turnaround: Crisis, Leadership, and the 2007
Olym pic Games
Mitt Romney: On Leadership. Faith, and  
American Values
2012
2008 Republican Teaching the Pig to Dance: A M em oir of  
Growing U p and Second Chances
2010
145
